


# Disaster Response: Early and Long-Term Recovery



## Building Resilient Communities

Risk Management and Response  
to Natural Disasters through  
Social Funds and Community-Driven  
Development Operations



THE WORLD BANK



## Abstract

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**This document is comprised of Modules 4 and 5 from the Toolkit described below.**

**T**he Toolkit “Building Resilient Communities: Risk Management and Response to Natural Disasters through Social Funds and Community-Driven Development Operations” is designed to help Task Teams on World Bank social funds and community-driven development (CDD) operations to identify disaster risk management issues in their programs and projects and to design and implement appropriate responses. It introduces the concepts and components of Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) and their key relationship to the achievement of the development and poverty reduction objectives of the World Bank. The contents draw upon the experience of social funds and CDD operations, as well as international good practice, to identify operational areas where social fund/CDD operations have a comparative advantage for achieving successful results in reducing natural disaster risks and impacts on poor and vulnerable communities. The Toolkit also provides guidance from past and current social fund/CDD operations about the most effective ways to manage operational challenges when implementing CBDRM activities, such as the rapid mobilization and scaling up of emergency response operations.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent.

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### Module Summary

*This module provides guidance on disaster response (immediate post-disaster actions, including rescue and relief) and early recovery (actions taken to support spontaneous recovery initiatives by affected communities). It summarizes key issues in community-based disaster response and recovery, as well as outlining actions that may be taken by social fund/CDD operations to support governments' management and coordination of disaster*

*response with the full and active participation of affected communities. Coordination with the United Nations and other international organizations is also discussed, as well as the development of common standards for aid delivery.*

*The module provides information on mobilizing and scaling up emergency response operations, including funding, procurement, human resources, disbursement, and fiduciary safeguards. Ways to conduct rapid and in-depth emergency needs assessments and vulnerability/gender targeting are explored. Options for forms of delivering relief and early recovery assistance are considered, such as cash- or commodity-based support, as well as ways to maintain good communications with affected communities throughout the response and recovery process.*


## ■ Key Principles of Community-Based Disaster Response and Early Recovery

Disaster response refers to the provision of assistance or intervention during or immediately after a disaster to meet the needs of those affected. It is generally immediate and short-term (UN/ISDR website, 2004). The primary objective of this humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. It includes immediate rescue and relief activities, such as the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services, and other assistance. It also includes the protection of vulnerable people, such as those involuntarily displaced from their homes or whose access to relief assistance may be affected by factors such as a disability.

Actions taken during the first weeks and months after a disaster have a major impact on the recovery process to follow, and they need to be planned and implemented accordingly (World Bank/IEG, 2006a). Disaster-affected communities initially will require critical life-saving support. However, many will begin a process of self-recovery as soon as possible, as their homes, institutions, and livelihoods will have been physically destroyed or weakened by the impact of the crisis. They often recreate the risks that turned a hazard into a disaster in the first place, such as by reconstructing homes using the same building techniques that caused them to collapse. Poor households may resort to selling off their scarce productive assets, such as livestock, to meet basic needs and thus become even more vulnerable to future shocks.

The choices made regarding the kinds of relief assistance to be provided, and how it is provided, can also facilitate or hinder the early recovery of affected communities (Christoplos, 2006a). As described in Module 1, after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) distributed galvanized iron sheets and tools to communities instead of expensive winterized tents that would not last long. The com-



**Figure 4.1: The Relief to Development Contiguuum**

munities used these items to build temporary shelters with materials salvaged from the rubble and later in permanent home reconstruction.

In addition, in rapid-onset disasters the sense of urgency that pervades relief efforts sometimes carries over into recovery, leading to shortcuts in consultative processes that may sideline local decision-making structures. People and institutions that might help rebuild communities may be left out. Too little may be done to ensure that the social and livelihoods needs of the affected population are considered. Poor and vulnerable groups may become even more disadvantaged than they were before the disaster (World Bank/IEG, 2006a).

For these reasons, early recovery work to restore essential services, livelihood opportunities, and governance capacity needs to take place in tandem with emergency

#### **Box 4.1 Speed versus quality in the Honduran Social Investment Fund**

After Hurricane Mitch, the Honduran Social Investment Fund (FHIS, from the name in Spanish) proved to be a suitable institution for carrying out emergency sub-projects since it was able to react quickly. But the speed accentuated the already existing weaknesses of FHIS, especially in the areas of quality assurance and sustainability. The direct involvement of beneficiaries in sub-project selection, design, and management was even less than it had been before. Getting things done quickly took priority over quality, leading to weaknesses in design, contracting, and supervision.

Source: Honduras Case Study, in this Toolkit.

assistance. This work should augment on-going humanitarian assistance operations, support spontaneous recovery initiatives by affected communities, and establish the foundations for longer-term recovery.<sup>1</sup> Early recovery assistance should create the conditions to support households, communities, and governments to undertake their own self-directed recovery and to withstand future shocks.

Experience has demonstrated a number of lessons (e.g., IFRC, 2007c; World Bank, 2006a; ALNAP/ProVention, 2008):

- Communities and individuals carry out most critical life-saving and relief activities following a rapid-onset disaster themselves, often assisted by the wider public and local and national institutions, including the military.
- Relief assistance that is not targeted to the specific needs and context of local communities often is inappropriate. After the Pakistan earthquake, heaps of donated used clothing, unsuited to cold conditions, disturbed aid traffic and prompted people to burn them to keep warm.
- Participatory community-based approaches produce good results. For instance, community-based therapeutic care is now recommended to treat uncomplicated severe acute malnutrition in emergencies. Where there are no medical complications, evaluations in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Malawi have indicated this is effective in terms of both cost and clinical outcomes.
- Communities can provide valuable information and resources during program implementation, especially for use in community targeting and distribution.
- The use of traditional community structures can also bring longer-term benefits for local ownership, participation, and sustainable impacts.

#### Box 4.2 Working with community organizations in disaster response

Seed banks set up by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) SOS Sahel during the 1997 drought emergency in Ethiopia were still in operation after the drought of 2004/05. SOS Sahel helped traditional funeral associations design, implement, and evaluate the project, increasing local ownership. As well as the initial seed stock, SOS Sahel provided training and capacity-building in book-keeping and community reporting systems to increase accountability.

*Source:* SOS Sahel in Hedlund, 2008, p. 11.

<sup>1</sup> Adapted from Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN/IASC), Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery Web site, 2008.

The World Bank's 1993 Argentina Flood Rehabilitation Project is a good example. The project facilitated good interaction between the beneficiaries and the authorities, which resulted in the timely availability of construction materials and the accommodation of local customs in the architectural design of the new houses. Staff observed that this created ownership among beneficiaries and increased maintenance (World Bank/IEG, 2006a).

## Possible Areas For Social Funds/CDD Operation Support

The new operational policy and procedures for *Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies* adopted by the World Bank in March 2007 (OP/BP 8.00) offer opportunities for social fund/community-driven development (CDD) operations to support relief to early recovery transitions, through the protection and restoration of key productive and community assets and the building of government and community recovery capacity during the disaster response. The Bank can provide rapid response in support of one or more of the following objectives:

- rebuilding and restoring physical assets;
- restoring the means of production and economic activities;
- preserving or restoring essential services;
- establishing and/or preserving human, institutional, and/or social capital, including economic reintegration of vulnerable groups;
- facilitating peace building;
- assisting with the crucial initial stages of building capacity for longer-term reconstruction, disaster management, and risk reduction; and
- supporting measures to mitigate or avert the potential effects of imminent emergencies or future emergencies or crises in countries at high risk.

OP and BP 8.00 also recognize the lead of other international institutions, in particular the United Nations, in emergency response programming outside of the Bank's traditional areas (such as relief, security, and specialized peace-building). They define the role of the World Bank in relief as focused on forming "appropriate partnership arrangements with other donors for the preparation, appraisal and supervision of activities outside its core competencies."

Thus, while social fund/CDD operations may not take a lead role in carrying out immediate emergency response, they can play important support roles, including contributing to coordinated rapid humanitarian needs assessment; leveraging pre-existing partnerships with other agencies, especially civil society organizations already engaged in project cycle facilitation, technical service provision, and service delivery; and harness-

### Box 4.3 Access to affected communities in Malawi

The Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) became a household name in Malawi as a result of its services for the poor. The MASAF was not designed to carry out relief activities, but when drought caught the country unprepared in 2004/2005, it became the vehicle of choice for the government to help poor people cope with the crisis.

MASAF's disaster response consisted mainly of cash-for-work and an agricultural inputs voucher scheme. Some of its strengths were:

- Both communities and government trusted MASAF as a delivery mechanism, due to its outreach and track record dating back to 1995;
- MASAF had the experience to design communication programs that played a key role in bringing stakeholders together on a common platform; and
- Communities understood the eligibility criteria and documentation requirements to obtain support, as they were developed using the existing MASAF funding framework.

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*Source: Malawi Case Study, in this Toolkit.*

ing well-tested participatory community engagement methodologies. Some social fund/CDD operations have demonstrated a strong capacity for immediate disaster response (e.g., in Pakistan, Honduras, and Malawi). An appropriate role for individual operations will need to be defined in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the disaster.

Social fund/CDD operations also can make a significant contribution to community-based early recovery by helping local and national governments manage donor and public pressure to spend money quickly and visibly in rapid-onset disasters; identifying community priorities through participatory processes; ensuring that communities and local government participate in planning, designing, implementing, and managing recovery projects; incorporating capacity-building for local governments and communities into projects; and including activities for disaster risk reduction and adaptation for climate change in programming.

The specific forms of assistance and delivery mechanisms selected should be based on a thorough understanding of the context, the needs and preferences of the affected population, the objectives of the assistance, an analysis of response options and associated risks, and the capacity of social fund/CDD operations. The nature of the assistance also will vary, depending on whether the natural disaster is slow-onset or rapid-onset.



### *Provision of Relief Items*

Emergency commodity assistance can take many forms, such as the supply of food, water, tents, tarpaulins, blankets, building materials, kitchen utensils, hygiene kits, medicines, water purification tablets, etc. Relief items may be provided in cash, in kind, or in a combination of these two approaches. Caution must be exercised in deciding what is required. In Bangladesh, for example, agencies distributed water purification tablets even though lessons from past flood responses indicated that they had limited effectiveness and that people did not use them because they felt they spoiled the taste of the water (Alam et al., 2008, p. 12).

Identifying, procuring, and distributing appropriate forms of commodity-based disaster relief assistance in a very short timeframe requires specialized logistical skills and systems. For a smaller-scale and localized disaster response, emergency supplies identified and stored as part of a local disaster preparedness plan may be sufficient to meet the most urgent needs. In larger-scale disasters, the presence of many organizations simultaneously procuring and supplying relief goods creates many complications. These can range from cargo congestion at airports and ports to domestic transport bottlenecks and blockages, as well as beneficiary targeting and security issues and the impacts of large-scale importation of goods or domestic procurement on local market dynamics.

If local markets have not been seriously disrupted or are not at risk of disruption, and if local capacity is intact or sufficiently supported, social fund/CDD community-based procurement systems are the preferred option. In addition to reducing the costs of shipping and transport from overseas, local purchase can help to stimulate the recovery of the local economy from the disaster.

In either context, it is important to coordinate closely with, or provide support through, U.N. or other experienced humanitarian relief agencies to ensure that relief assistance is appropriate, adequate, and well targeted and does not distort local markets. Markets must be closely monitored to ensure that adverse inflationary or livelihoods impacts do not occur as a result of the commodity choices made, or to mitigate their consequences, if unavoidable. For example, the livelihood of the local makers of clay roofing tile was severely affected when agencies distributed metal sheeting in the 2000 flood response in Bangladesh (ActionAid, 2002, in Alam et al., 2008). Emergency relief items provided by donors and major operational players also should be standardized and harmonized in order to facilitate field operations and logistics, to improve quality assurance, communication, and reporting, and to avoid inappropriate donations (ICRC Web site, 2008).

In larger-scale disasters, a UN UN/IASC in-country logistical cluster group is often formed to play these roles. In addition, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Move-

ment (RC/RC) has developed an *Emergency Items Catalogue* (Catalogue) that provides generic technical specifications for essential relief items (ICRC, 2005a).

### **Provision of Shelter**

The importance of the provision of emergency shelter and shelter-related non-food items is particularly worth noting, given the critical role they play in household survival, livelihoods, and protection. The choices made in the form of emergency shelter to be provided can have a direct impact on the speed and manner in which households and communities are able to move from emergency to durable solutions.

Social fund/CDD operations have provided emergency shelter assistance in the past but are more commonly involved in transitional and permanent shelter/housing. Module 5 provides guidance on emergency, transitional, and permanent housing and human settlements support. However, emergency operations should be aware that a number of decisions on shelter and housing—as well as on water and sanitation and communal infrastructure—will need to be made during the emergency and early recovery responses and should consult Module 5 accordingly.

### **Protection and Restoration of Livelihoods**

For the poor and vulnerable, recovery from the impact of disasters depends significantly on how well livelihoods are protected and restored (Alam et al., 2008). The loss of income and productive assets through a disaster may cause households that already were in a state of transient poverty to sink into chronic poverty and also cause households that were on the verge of poverty to become impoverished. This is particularly the case when large groups of people have been affected by a disaster or were subjected to multiple, repetitive shocks and cannot resort to traditional reciprocity-based coping mechanisms because the coping capacity of family, friends, and neighbors has also been eroded. People in this situation are often forced to sell their productive and household assets (Alam et al., 2008).

During the critical initial period of disaster response, social fund/CDD operations can play a key role in helping people protect their income and assets through existing community outreach mechanisms. This may include activities such as:

- Replacing lost livestock and other agricultural inputs and tools;
- Replacing household assets;
- Providing fodder and veterinary services to ensure livestock survival;
- Organizing seed fairs, seed vouchers, or cash for seed; and

**Box 4.4 Negative coping strategies to replace lost assets**

A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (2001) after the 1998 Bangladesh flood found that 55 percent of households lost assets, equivalent to 16 percent of their pre-flood total assets value. In Mozambique, the World Bank noted that “during the recovery period these assets were, in general, not replaced, leaving the households more vulnerable to subsequent disaster episodes” (World Bank, 2005).

NGOs working in affected areas of Bangladesh following Cyclone Sidr in November 2007 reported that many poor households had taken out private loans at exorbitant rates within a few weeks of the disaster. These households did not have access to microfinance institutions or had previously taken credit from two or three of these institutions and were at risk of defaulting on their loans (even though a three-month grace period was granted on loan repayment following the cyclone). The borrowed funds were largely used to replace lost productive assets for fishing, planting crops, and running small trade shops or home-based industries. The vulnerability of these households had increased, as they now had to produce an even higher output to pay off the additional debt.

Conversely, some households reportedly avoided this situation by using a government cash payment of BDT 5,000 received for house repair to replace lost assets and resume income-earning activities.

*Source:* Burton, 2008 (unpublished).

- Replacing stock, equipment, or tools lost by small businesses (including home-based businesses).

It is important that asset protection and replacement activities are developed based on needs assessments and linked to broader longer-term strategies to restore or strengthen livelihoods. For example, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition’s 2006 evaluation of aid agency responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquakes found that women, fisherfolk, and small businesses were stereotyped: “The concentration on the distribution of assets, especially boats, demonstrated a failure to understand and support diversified and sustainable livelihoods and communities” (Christoplos, 2006b, p. 19). Assessments also are required in order to determine local preferences and market capacity to meet needs. In Kenya in 2000, Catholic Relief Services organized 14 seed fairs in three weeks, providing preferred seed for timely planting to over 8,000 families. Other organizations that relied on seed ordered from companies failed to receive supplies in time for planting (CRS, 2004).

Remittances from family members who are working in other areas or countries also have become an increasingly key component of disaster-affected peoples’ coping strategies. This was the case in Sri Lanka, for instance, following the 2004 tsunami.

Net private remittances grew by more than 28 percent between 2004 and 2005 and topped \$1.7 billion, and some skilled expatriates returned home to provide medical support to affected communities (IOM, 2006). Annex 4.1 provides further details on the role of remittances in natural disasters.<sup>2</sup>

Social fund/CDD operations are already engaged in activities to increase poor communities' access to modern technological cash transfer mechanisms. Help in the restoration of remittance flows after a disaster may be a quick and effective way of supporting livelihoods recovery, especially as recipients tend to share remittances with their extended families and even their neighbors (Savage and Harvey, 2007).

### **Restoration of Community Assets**

Where poor households have lost their means of making a living or become food-insecure, food aid or labor-intensive public works schemes (e.g., food-for-work) to restore or improve community assets can provide them with much-needed income. Rubble clearance, marketplace rehabilitation, or drought mitigation works are examples of commonly used means of injecting income into the local economy in the aftermath of a disaster.

The use of cash in emergency responses, either as an alternative or a complement to commodity assistance, is increasing. This includes cash grants, cash for work, providing cash to microfinance institutions for low-interest loans or other forms of financial support, and vouchers for goods such as seed and livestock. While there has been some debate over the strengths and weaknesses of cash-based approaches over the past decade, a number of organizations have systematically collected evidence regarding the appropriate circumstances in which to use cash, the policies and procedures required to do so, and the results that can be achieved.

Overall, research has found that in appropriate circumstances cash-based programs can be less costly, more timely, and better adjusted to people's needs and preferences than the distribution of commodities (Oxfam, 2006; Harvey, 2006; Adams and Harvey, 2007; SDC; etc). Beneficiaries have used unconditional cash transfers for a variety of purposes (Oxfam, 2006), such as:

- Purchase of food, kitchen utensils, clothes;
- Paying off debts and loans and extending credit;
- Payment of school costs for fees, clothes, transport;

<sup>2</sup> Another useful source of information on remittances is Savage K and Harvey P (2007). *Remittances during crises: implications for humanitarian response, Briefing Paper 26*. London: ODI, p. 4. hpgbrief26



### Box 4.5 Use of unconditional cash grants in Sri Lanka

A cash grant program for families affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquakes was initiated by the government and supported by the livelihood component of the Bank's assistance program. First, families affected by the disaster were identified by a local official (*Grama Niladhari*, the administrator of the lowest administrative unit of about five villages), who sent the list of families up to the Divisional Secretaries. The aggregated lists at the divisional level were then sent to the commercial bank branches in affected areas that created accounts in the names of these families. Finally, the funds from the Treasury were transferred to the relevant banks, which in turn credited the beneficiaries' accounts. The cash transfers given were for \$50 per family (in four installments, with the first occurring three months after the tsunami). These transfers supplemented three other assistance programs, including a one-time payment to families who had suffered deaths, a dry ration program, and a housing grant intended for families who suffered full or partial destruction of housing.

Source: Vakis, 2006, p. 10.

- Purchase of livestock and agricultural inputs;
- Payment for health care;
- Setting up small shops; and
- Purchase of tools for petty trade, such as wood cutting or donkey carting.

The 2006 IEG evaluation highlighted the Bank's positive experiences in post-disaster cash transfer programming, noting that "cash support stabilizes the situation of the poor during early recovery" (World Bank/IEG, 2006a, p. 49). This includes initiatives like the rental funds support provided to households displaced by Turkey's 1999 Marmara earthquake and house reconstruction support (both cash and materials) provided to small farmers following the 1991 North China earthquake.

Social fund/CDD operations have a demonstrated capacity in the effective use of cash-based approaches for relief and recovery, such as the social safety net activities of Madagascar's Community Development Project. This includes being able to meet the important requirements for success at ensuring high levels of community participation at all stages of design and implementation, providing appropriate technical guidance, and establishing both community-based and external quality assurance systems.

The community block grant system of many social fund/CDD operations, with its emphasis on building the capacity of communities in the procurement and financing of their own sub-projects, provides another mechanism for communities to receive direct cash transfers. As participatory techniques are used in needs assessment and decision-making, beneficiaries can have their self-identified priority needs for goods and services met. Procurement is sometimes also faster, simpler, and more transparent

**Box 4.6 Malawi: Implementing a productive safety net in response to drought**

In response to drought in 2004/2005, the Malawi government implemented a Public Works Program through the Malawi Social Action Fund. In September-December 2005, cash income was provided to vulnerable households through Conditional Cash Transfers (PWP-CCT) to enable them to buy food and agricultural inputs for the next growing season. The program contributed to Malawi producing a bumper crop of 1.5 million tonnes of maize in 2006.

The PWP-CCT was designed along the lines of MASAF 3 Local Authority Managed Projects, a conventional Public Works Program that MASAF had been implementing for 10 years. Beneficiaries were paid a wage that was 20 percent lower than the market wage; the local leadership, with assistance from the Local Authorities, selected the beneficiaries. Only one person per household was eligible to work under the program. The program's innovation was to tie the cash payment to a condition that beneficiaries buy seeds and fertilizer as inputs for the following year's harvest. After working on the program for 10 days, beneficiaries earned enough to buy one 50-kilogram bag of maize and one 50-kilogram bag of subsidized fertilizer. The PWP-CCT ran alongside a government program of farm inputs subsidies. If there had been no parallel government initiative, the cash transfer would have been inadequate to meet the cost of these inputs.

Nearly 600,000 people benefited directly from the public works program. MASAF successfully disbursed \$12.1 million to all 28 district assemblies of Malawi, and 1,838 public works sub-projects were carried out across the country.

*Adapted from October 2006, "MASAF Public Works Projects-Conditional Cash Transfer: Citizen Feedback on Performance and Implementation of the Drought Response Program," MASAF, Lilongwe, Malawi, and May 2006, "Findings Issue 262, Malawi: Public Works Programme—Conditional Cash Transfers as an Emergency Response to a National Food Shortage," World Bank, Operations Results and Learning Unit, Africa Region, Washington, DC.*

than programs undertaken through government line ministries (e.g., the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Aceh, Indonesia).

Likewise, funding can be channeled through social fund/CDD-supported microfinance institutions and savings societies to provide low-interest credit to meet such needs. The Mongolia Sustainable Livelihoods Program (MSLP) has a CDD funding "window" that is used to finance demand-driven investments in basic infrastructure at the level of community groups and investments in pastoral risk management to improve herding communities' preparedness for and post-disaster recovery from drought and winter storms. The MSLP also has created separate financing windows to meet individual or community needs. There may be potential to expand this delivery channel for future emergencies.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In 2008, the SEEP Network published guidance on interventions to promote enterprises, employment, cash flow, and asset management with conflict- or disaster-affected businesses and households. SEEP recovery standards (draft)

### Box 4.7 Emergency Assistance Social Fund, Kecamatan Development Program, Aceh

The Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquakes hit 38 sub-districts in Aceh, Indonesia, at various stages of implementing KDP sub-projects. In many locations, these initiatives were destroyed or the community's situation changed dramatically. Communities faced immediate shortages of basic necessities such as food, blankets, tarpaulins, water containers, household utensils, and cooking equipment (amounting to 5.3 percent of total KDP funds for 2005).

In almost all cases, villages hit by the tsunami had funds in their communal accounts that had not yet been disbursed. They were permitted to allocate 25 percent of these funds to any pressing social needs they deemed urgent and necessary. The items to be purchased were detailed in "procurement packets" for recording purposes and then the funds were distributed to those in need. The affected villages were also permitted to allocate another 25 percent of the next cycle of KDP funding to their village account if they decided there were families and individuals still in need of assistance. New villages joining KDP were also entitled to allocate 25 percent of their block grants for social purposes, as long as they had been affected by the tsunami.

*Source:* Indonesia Case Study, in this Toolkit.

When considering the use of cash-based approaches, the following issues are important to address (adapted from Hedlund, 2008, p. 6):

- Accurate market analysis and monitoring is crucial to ensure that cash provided will meet needs as intended. The food equivalent—how much food the cash will buy—can vary considerably between seasons and places, and particularly between urban and rural areas. This applies to other commodities as well, such as seed and livestock.
- There must be realistic assessment of the capacity to distribute cash and sufficient funds for capacity-building. This includes the management and administration of cash, accounting, logistics of transport and distribution, supervision, and monitoring. For example, following the 2007 cyclone in Bangladesh, the Bank undertook cash distribution through the Local Governance Support Project (LGSP) as part of a short-term livelihoods response. The Bank had to adapt the LGSP framework due to the widely divergent levels of capacity in the Union Parishads (local government), most of which were not yet part of the LGSP.
- The choice of how to distribute cash must reflect a program's objectives, targeting strategy, existing infrastructure for managing cash, and security conditions.
- In larger-scale disasters, where multiple agencies are operating, coordination is important to ensure that common wage labor and other standards are applied to cash-for-work schemes to avoid causing wage inflation, competition between

- agencies, or mistargeting of the poor and vulnerable due to setting wage rates too high.
- Monitoring the impact of cash distributions requires gender sensitivity, as decisions about how cash is spent and who makes that decision, may create conflict within households. In Malawi, the NGO Concern used gender-specific techniques to find out how men and women spent the funds.

### **Meeting Psychosocial Support Needs**

The importance of providing psychosocial support to the survivors of disasters has been increasingly recognized (IFRC, 2004; ALNAP/ProVention, 2005; UN/IASC, 2007). In addition to grief counseling, providing survivors with income-earning opportunities tied to physical work can be very effective (World Bank, 2005). Participation in shelter reconstruction also can play a vital role in the psychosocial recovery process if there is an active role for survivors.

In 2007 the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) released the *IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings* (Guidelines), which identify a number of community-level forms of support that can help disaster survivors deal with their trauma. Social fund/CDD operations in Pakistan and Aceh also have trained community-level staff to recognize and respond to trauma among disaster-affected people.

## **Operational Issues**


### **Identifying Response and Recovery Needs**

Needs assessment and community participation are critically linked to effective targeting of relief and recovery assistance. Target populations must be identified on the basis of actual need, and beneficiary consultation and participation is essential for effective targeting (Beck, 2005b). Coordinated, multi-disciplinary, multi-agency assessments are the best mechanism to ensure that these needs and priorities are adequately identified and the linkages between sectors understood (World Bank/IEG, 2006a). They also can avoid or reduce the problem of duplication and identify gaps in aid coverage.

Post-disaster needs assessments should take place in stages and be viewed as a continuous process rather than a 'one-off' exercise conducted shortly after a disaster. A staged approach is needed because in rapid-onset disasters the situation can change rapidly, as affected households and communities constantly reassess their



**Figure 4.2: Needs Assessment Processes**



options and take action accordingly. For instance, temporarily displaced people often move between a number of different types of accommodation, based on costs, livelihood needs, anticipation of compensation or rebuilding assistance, and other factors. It is important to understand these dynamics in order to ensure that relief and recovery responses remain relevant and appropriate. Even in slow-onset disasters the ability to interpret and respond to early warning information in a timely and appropriate manner requires regular and ongoing monitoring and dialogue with communities.

### Rapid and in-depth assessments

In the case of rapid-onset disasters, rapid assessments normally take place over the critical first 24 to 72 hours of the emergency, at the same time as initial life-saving rescue and relief operations. Preliminary information is gathered about deaths and injuries; access to food, water, sanitation and shelter; and the condition of key lifeline facilities (hospitals, access roads, etc.). Environmental hazards also need to be identified (toxic spills, landslide risk areas, etc.). Initial observations can be made about damage and losses to housing, livelihoods, the environment, and other infrastructure.

**Table 4.1 Main Categories of Information in an Emergency Assessment**

- Vulnerable/at risk groups
- Coping strategies
- Health
- Food and nutrition
- Safety, security, and protection
- Water, sanitation, and hygiene
- Shelter
- Livelihoods
- Infrastructure
- Environmental hazards

If this information is systematically gathered using simple pre-designed standard forms and Geographic Positioning System technology, where possible, it can be invaluable for planning both emergency and recovery assistance. Annex 4. 2 provides examples of the 24 and 72 hour emergency assessment form templates used by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

This can be complemented by more in-depth assessments of community needs, vulnerabilities, and coping strategies over the course of the first few weeks. The detailed identification of vulnerable groups with special relief/recovery needs within the local context (single parents, orphans, landless tenants, etc.) should be carried out at this time. For slow-onset disasters, existing social fund/CDD data collection and analysis methods can be used, but within a more intensified monitoring framework.<sup>4</sup>

Social fund/CDD operations can support local governments and partner organizations to mobilize to carry out this work, supported by operations staff. This has been done successfully in many operations, such as in Indonesia, Malawi, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Often, information has already begun to flow upwards quickly from community-based organizations (CBOs) through existing project mechanisms within hours of a disaster striking.

The Honduran Social Investment Fund, in collaboration with the Unit for Social Indicators within the State Secretariat for Planning, developed a social data mapping system

#### Box 4.8 Mobilizing local resources to carry out emergency assessments

The Philippines national Linking Arms Against Poverty-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services Program, KALAHI-CIDSS, was being piloted in Quezon Province when four successive destructive tropical cyclones struck the area, causing intensive flooding and landslides. The Local Government Units, through their disaster coordinating councils, immediately carried out damage and needs assessment with the relevant government agencies. They also essentially led the search and rescue, evacuation, retrieval and relief, and recovery operations during the disaster response.

Source: World Bank draft case study of Kalahi-CIDSS, unpublished.

<sup>4</sup> Numerous guides are available on emergency/early recovery needs assessments, such as IFRC emergency assessment guidelines (emergency guidelines), Benfield/CARE rapid environmental impact assessment guidelines (Rapid EIA; Shelter env checklist), UNHCR participatory assessment guidelines (UNHCR guidelines), UN/IASC health/nutrition/WASH clusters' rapid assessment tool (WASH/Nutrition guidelines), and UN/IASC gender handbook (Gender Handbook).

that integrated digitized maps of the country with available statistics on access to social services, population characteristics and social indicators, and investments from the social fund. This proved to be a useful tool for setting priorities and targeting areas and communities in most need of help.

### Joint damage, loss, and needs assessments

The World Bank often plays a lead role in coordinating with governments and donors after major rapid-onset disasters. Joint damage, loss, and needs assessments (JDLNAs) usually commence three to six weeks after the event and lead to multi-donor financed reconstruction and rehabilitation programs.<sup>5</sup> While the JDLNAs make a positive contribution to coordinated assessment and planning of rehabilitation and reconstruction, past assessments have had some shortcomings:

- They generally have not been updated as more accurate information comes in.
- Country and social context and the differential effects of disaster on vulnerable groups have received little attention.
- They have focused on needs without considering capacities (World Bank/IEG, 2006a).

Through a recent initiative, efforts are now being made to integrate the JDLNAs with U.N. community-focused early recovery needs assessments to produce a combined Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNAs). Social fund/CDD operations can make a significant contribution to improving the accuracy and quality of JDLNAs and to developing the PDNA methodology by providing pre-and post-disaster information on poverty, vulnerability, and coping strategies of the affected population. They can coordinate and encourage inputs and participation from local NGOs, CBOs, and international humanitarian NGOs, whose knowledge and experience have not been well incorporated in the past. This information also should support operations' application of social analysis, indigenous people's issues (OP/BP 4.20), involuntary resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and environmental assessment (OP/BP 4.01) safeguards.

For example, following the 2004 tsunami and earthquakes, the level of physical damage and losses was overestimated in Aceh Province, while in Pakistan it was underestimated. Both situations created later difficulties for government and aid agencies in adjusting their strategies and programming to a different emerging reality. The KDP and the PPAF were able to undertake in-depth assessments through their community mobilization structures and produce more accurate and contextualized information

<sup>5</sup> JDLNAs are carried out using a methodology developed by the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC Methodology). The World Bank offers staff training courses on the methodology, which are available through the Bank's training catalogue.

### Box 4.9 Assessing damage, losses and needs in Aceh Province

The Kecamatan Development Program assisted the JDLNA following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquakes, with community facilitators administering a damage and loss assessment survey. The results were summarized by the facilitators and local government managers before being sent to the provincial capital for analysis. The community maps produced of damage and loss stayed in the village or local government offices and served as the basis for discussions about repairs and improvements. The information collected through the damage and loss survey, combined with additional information gathered by the facilitators, was seen widely as the most reliable source of factual information about conditions in the field.

The damage and loss profile indicated that the priorities for reconstruction focused on rebuilding the livelihoods and social fabric of the devastated communities. The sectors identified as needing attention were: providing housing and shelter; generating enterprise, commerce, and income creation; rebuilding rural livelihoods (agriculture and fisheries); providing public services; assisting the newly vulnerable; and rebuilding communities.

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*Source: Indonesia Case Study, in this Toolkit.*

about the disaster's impact. This information also was used by government planners and communities to target assistance.

For slow-onset disasters, social fund/CDD operations appear to have well-established information-sharing and planning mechanisms with governments and donors. There may be further scope for direct involvement of CBOs and local partner organizations in this work. There also may be scope to support improvements to community-based early warning systems (CBEWS) (refer to Annex 3.2) and the use of this information to guide earlier responses to impending crises, such as famine. Effective CBEWS are becoming increasingly important in the context of climate change.

### Continued assessment

Once detailed assessments have been carried out and agencies are fully operational, information should be continuously collected and analyzed to ensure that programs remain relevant and effective. This includes inviting feedback from and reporting to beneficiaries on progress and issues.

### Targeting Vulnerable Groups

#### Forms of vulnerability

Disaster impacts on people vary, depending on their levels of social vulnerability and risk. The uneven impacts of disaster arise from differences in income status, culture, gender, home location, and land tenure. Relief and recovery assistance can exacerbate



these differences if not carefully targeted. Those who were already poor and socially vulnerable are usually at higher risk (see “Addressing Vulnerability” in Module 1 for details). For example, inequities have occurred when the immediate cash needs of the poor have been ignored during the emergency response and they have had to sell their productive assets (World Bank/IEG, 2006a).

The UN/IASC Protection Cluster also has identified a number of vulnerability and protection risks that can arise as a result of natural disasters. Some of these are unequal access to assistance, discrimination in aid provision, enforced relocation, sexual and gender-based violence, loss of documentation, recruitment of children into fighting forces, unsafe or involuntary return or resettlement, and issues of property restitution.<sup>6</sup> For instance, after the 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador, single women insisted that the sheeting provided for temporary shelters be opaque and strong. In the past, it had been translucent, making it easy to see when they were alone. Given that it could easily be cut with a machete, many women had been raped (ALNAP, 2003).

### Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Natural disasters often force many among the affected population to leave their homes, with a high number of people becoming temporarily or permanently internally displaced. Experience has shown that discrimination and disregard for economic, social, and cultural rights may emerge during emergency response. The longer the displacement lasts, the greater the risk of human rights violations (UN/IASC, 2006a). Although responsibility for the protection of IDPs rests with national governments and local authorities, they are often unwilling or unable to meet these needs. Thus groups providing humanitarian assistance must include effective safeguarding of the rights of IDPs under international humanitarian and human rights law (OCHA/UN/IASC, 1999).

Important among these is the right of IDPs to make informed and voluntary decisions as to whether they want to return, to settle and integrate at the place where they found refuge, or to go elsewhere (Brookings Institution-University of Bern, 2007). There may be situations in which the national authorities may determine that conditions are too unsafe to permit return to an area (e.g., the disaster has made the area uninhabitable). However, there have also been situations where forced relocation has occurred (e.g., when habitation risks were actually not high or a disaster offered an opportunity to move poorer people away from land with potentially higher value and to re-develop it). Social fund/CDD operations will need to take these considerations into account when determining appropriate forms of post-disaster

<sup>6</sup> *Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters: UN/IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disaster*, 2006. Guidelines

support for IDPs, including livelihoods and social cohesion issues in situations where relocation is the only option.<sup>7</sup>

### Targeting criteria

The principles used to take vulnerability into account when designing social fund/CDD projects under normal circumstances are equally applicable to disaster contexts.<sup>8</sup> In fact, the need for inclusive approaches becomes magnified, as this can have an adverse impact on survival and recovery within some marginalized groups.

Although exceptions may be made during emergencies for the full application of social and environmental safeguards to programming, attention must still be given to these issues, as well as to the policies and procedures in relation to indigenous people (OP/BP 4.10) and involuntary resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). This information will be particularly important to guide accelerated combined identification-preparation-appraisal missions.

Collecting information on the age, gender, and diversity of the affected population allows for more accurate targeting of assistance to ensure it is equitable and reaches the most vulnerable and marginalized.<sup>9</sup> It is equally important to understand power relations (World Bank/IEG, 2006). Often women and minority groups have less social, economic, and political power and are less well represented in formal leadership structures. Youth, the elderly, the disabled, landless tenants, and families hosting those displaced may also be less visible and inadvertently overlooked in assessment processes. At-risk groups can include those who move from transient to chronic poverty or those who find themselves impoverished as a result of the disaster—a factor not always recognized in relief and recovery planning.

Issues of inclusion need to be periodically monitored and incorporated into monitoring and evaluation systems, including performance indicators. Partner organizations and government may need training in how to work with marginalized vulnerable groups and how to use participatory techniques. While existing social fund/CDD criteria can be largely applied, they may need to be adjusted to account for the changing circumstances of different groups, such as the large number of people who become permanently disabled following an earthquake.

<sup>7</sup> The Brookings Institution–University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement also has developed a field manual on human rights and natural disaster (Field Manual) and a useful framework on identifying durable solutions for IDPs (Durable Solutions)

<sup>8</sup> For example: Van Domelen J (2007). *Reaching the Poor and Vulnerable: Targeting Strategies for Social Funds and other Community-Driven Programs*. World Bank/HDN. Targeting strategies

<sup>9</sup> The UK's Disaster and Emergency Response Group has developed a Gender and Diversity Checklist for Disaster and Emergency Response. Checklist

### Targeting mechanisms

Choosing the right targeting strategies to ensure that those most vulnerable and in need are reached in a disaster can be tricky. A combination of targeting strategies may be required, with close monitoring of their outcomes (Hedlund, 2007). These can include:

- Geographic targeting, provided this does not get determined by political considerations;
- Administrative targeting by specific groups (e.g., the elderly, single-parent households, children, the disabled);
- Self-targeting, where an individual or family can decide if they want to participate (e.g., setting wages at or below market rates in a cash-for-work program); and
- Community-based targeting, where the community decides who is most vulnerable.

Social fund/CDD operations are highly experienced in vulnerability targeting and can apply most existing methods and tools to the disaster context, albeit initially needing to use the most rapid and simple methods for gathering information. At the same time, it is important to be aware that community norms sometimes may be at odds with agency norms about what constitutes “poverty” and “vulnerability.” Local leaders or organizations may wish to distribute resources more equally to the wider community on the basis that “everyone has been affected by the emergency, so everyone should receive a share of the aid.” The concept of what constitutes a community also may be contested, especially in displacement situations.

#### Box 4.10 Vulnerability in the Pakistan earthquake

Culture-specific definitions of vulnerability used in the *Implementation Guidelines for the PPAF Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction* teams included:

1. Widows having no male child over the age of 18
2. Women with disabled husbands
3. Divorced women / abandoned women / unmarried women who are past marriageable age and are dependent on others
4. Disabled (physically or mentally)
5. Unaccompanied minors (i.e., orphans)
6. Unaccompanied elders over the age of 60
7. Landless due to land sliding / red zones/fault line area

Regardless of the targeting strategy used, more successful targeting outcomes are associated with:

- A multi-agency structure and inter-agency dialogue, including government and non-government organizations, to make targeting decisions; and
- An appeal process communicated clearly to communities—who to appeal to, how appeals should be carried out, and how appellants can expect to be treated (DFID, 2006b).

Women's access to the appeal process is very important, as they are often under social pressure not to complain. Appeals need to be documented in order to track individual cases and to monitor whether certain groups are systematically excluded or favored (Hedlund, 2008).

### **Achieving Gender Equity<sup>10</sup>**

Gender analysis of all relief, recovery, and reconstruction projects is essential in order to assess and monitor their direct and indirect impacts on women's time and resources. Attention to gender is consistently one of the weakest areas of humanitarian response (ALNAP, 2004). Poor women are likely to be among the groups most seriously affected,

#### **Box 4.11 Combining vulnerability targeting methods**

Following Indonesia's Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquake in 2006, the IFRC undertook a large-scale temporary shelter program, a priority need identified by local communities during a post-disaster needs assessment. Tools and materials, along with cash grants, were provided to neighborhood groups to carry out the construction work.

The communities were initially selected for support by correlating high pre-disaster poverty levels with high levels of post-disaster damage and loss. Communities already covered by other aid organizations were then screened out. Rapid and in-depth assessments were carried out with these communities.

Neighborhoods chose the most vulnerable in their community to receive building assistance first, on the basis of their own local knowledge combined with basic criteria provided by the IFRC (i.e., the elderly, disabled, single-parent households, expectant mothers, orphans). There were no disputes over the selection process during implementation.

Source: IFRC, 2008

<sup>10</sup> This section draws heavily from the work of ALNAP and ProVention's "learning from disasters" series of briefing papers.

and older poor women from minorities may be even harder hit and the last to recover. There may also be higher levels of gender-based violence following a disaster. If entry points for appropriate consultation with women are not identified and used, there may be low understanding of a number of protection risks. This can be especially the case if a woman has lost her male relatives or they are severely or permanently injured (Module 7 provides detailed information on gender considerations in disaster response).

### **Ensuring Good Beneficiary Communications**

The social fund/CDD operations can play a key and often overlooked role in early disaster response—ensuring that information reaches affected people in a clear and timely manner about relief assistance and emerging plans for recovery assistance. This is especially important for ensuring that communities understand the selection criteria, documentation requirements, and feedback or complaint mechanisms available for sub-projects/activities. It is equally important to get the feedback of affected people to ensure that what is being done is appropriate and is meeting their priority needs, including the creation of formal grievance mechanisms. (“Social Accountability Mechanisms” in Module 6 outlines some of the grievance and feedback mechanisms that have been created through social fund/CDD operations.)

The media also play an important role in disseminating information and giving voice to community concerns and perceptions. They can be influential either in ensuring that a response is adequately funded and that attention is given to longer-term recovery and risk reduction issues or in taking a short-term view and pressuring agencies to disburse funds quickly (Beck, 2005b). Therefore advocacy with the media should be included in communications strategies.

#### **Box 4.12 Ensuring good stakeholder communications during emergency operations**

For its emergency operation in Aceh Province, the Kecamatan Development Program recruited 28 sub-district information facilitators in addition to its existing network of male and female village technical and empowerment facilitators. The responsibilities of the information facilitators covered most aspects of gender-disaggregated data collection, information sharing, and communication with stakeholders and external partners (NGOs, donors, etc). The facilitators also were responsible for dissemination of information about the program to local stakeholders, documenting program activities, and interacting with the media. They contributed to the high level of participation of villagers at all stages of the relief and recovery process, an important factor in its success.

*Source:* Indonesia Case Study, in this Toolkit.

## Coordinating and Managing Response and Recovery

When stakeholders' views are not considered, the solution they are given often fails to solve their problems (World Bank/IEG, 2006). Emergency response and recovery should build on and be coordinated with local and national disaster risk management strategies, preparedness plans, and mechanisms, engaging in dialogue if these are inappropriate or ineffective (World Bank/IEG, 2006; Alam et al., 2008). If there are functional national/local disaster management committees or equivalent bodies in the affected areas (preferably with both government and civil society representation), they should become the focus of relief and recovery planning. At the same time, social fund/CDD operations will need to be prepared to support governments and communities in the event of a breakdown of systems or overwhelming loss of life during a rapid-onset disaster.

### National government

Social fund/CDD operations should aim to support the national leadership to manage and coordinate relief and recovery. Government response and recovery plans should be developed in consultation with affected communities and other stakeholders, including the private sector. Where governments are highly centralized, or where there are issues of corruption or lack of access to communities, achieving this outcome may not be easy.<sup>11</sup>

For a larger-scale disaster, national governments sometimes create temporary national relief and/or recovery coordination bodies. These may be tiered down to the state/provincial and district levels. While this is a useful way to concentrate the resources required to deal with a complex major response, it also can create dilemmas. Line agencies may feel bypassed or become competitive about obtaining their share of the resources. The normal disaster management committee or agency also may become sidelined. If the Bank provides technical support to temporary agencies, it would be desirable to encourage governments to integrate those who are normally involved in smaller-scale disaster management into these structures and to develop a transition strategy that progressively builds their capacity to undertake response and recovery coordination roles.

If a natural disaster strikes in a conflict-affected area, government capacity and mechanisms for management and coordination may be weak or non-existent. Planning and coordination structures may need to be established with external support, building upon established mechanisms for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the

<sup>11</sup> Some useful insights into approaches for negotiating access in difficult contexts can be found in Ramalingam B and Pavanello S (2008). *Cyclone Nargis: Lessons for Operational Agencies*. London: ALNAP. Nargis paper

conflict-affected population. Decision-makers will need to consider the equity implications of the types and levels of support given to disaster-affected communities in relation to that provided to conflict-affected communities. For instance, if people previously displaced from their homes by conflict see those displaced by a natural disaster being given priority in housing, this can create tensions within or between communities.

### Local government

While support to national government is important, coordination tends to be more effective at the local level, and community participation and response work better through decentralized structures (Houghton, 2005). Social fund/CDD operations can support local governments to coordinate and direct local relief and recovery efforts. For example, the FHIS emergency response in Honduras gave an important coordinating role to municipalities and mayors in deciding on priorities for emergency sub-projects. This helped build their capacity and paved the way for a pilot in 2002 of a decentralized operation of the project cycle for FHIS sub-projects, in which municipalities became largely responsible for the process and communities were better integrated.

At the same time, local governments may be overwhelmed by international support and/or, conversely, be bypassed by aid agencies due to their real or perceived lack of capacity. This has occurred even in slow-onset disasters. For major disasters, the World Bank and other donors have provided technical advisers and other resources to assist national level government relief and reconstruction/recovery coordination bodies, to good effect. Providing similar forms of support to local governments working in disaster-affected areas is equally or even more important, as the human and financial resource base is likely to be more limited, yet the focus of operational response will be centered at this level.

There can be challenges to doing this. Local governments and their elected representatives have to manage many small and diverse interest groups. They may be unfamiliar or uncomfortable with community-based relief/recovery planning, distribution and accountability systems. Programming expectations also must be kept in line with absorptive capacity, especially during the more complex and resource-intensive recovery stage. Social fund/CDD operations will need to draw from their pre-disaster experience to identify appropriate and acceptable ways to build capacity to manage pluralistic stakeholders in an equitable way, while ensuring financial and social accountability for projects.

In some rapid-onset disasters, there is damage and dislocation to the local government and its facilities, including the loss of its staff due to death or injury. For instance, following the recent earthquake in Pakistan, affected municipalities in the North West



Frontier Province (NWFP) suffered severe damage and losses to buildings and equipment, including the loss of approximately 25 percent of their revenue records and 85 percent of municipal birth, death, police, judicial, and other records (World Bank/PPAF, 2008). In such cases, local governments may need support from the social fund/CDD operation to rebuild capacity while the operation works through other partner organizations to deliver assistance to affected communities. Where this occurs, local governments should be kept informed and their direct participation reintroduced as their situation improves.

### Local partners and community-based organizations

Local partner organizations and CBOs are the backbone of community-based disaster response and recovery. Social fund/CDD operations have found that they provide rapid, accurate information about disaster impacts and have effective outreach to affected communities. They have the local knowledge to identify vulnerable people for assistance and can facilitate the re-establishment of social cohesion, identified as vital to recovery in the 2006 evaluation of the World Bank's assistance for natural disasters (WB/IEG, 2006a).

Consultation with partner NGOs, institutions, and CBOs should commence as soon as possible following a disaster, and their respective roles and relationships with the social fund/CDD emergency operation should be clearly defined. This includes assessing whether they have been adversely affected by the disaster themselves or, when they receive requests to partner with incoming humanitarian organizations, how they will balance and manage these roles. Ideally this will have been done previously, as part of disaster preparedness planning for operations working in disaster-prone provinces/districts or countries.

#### Box 4.13 The key role played by local partners in disaster response and recovery

The speed and effectiveness of the initial response to the Pakistan earthquake was attributed to PPAF's existing presence in the affected areas. Information regarding the impact came from community organizations through partner organizations up to the PPAF field teams and headquarters. When distributing corrugated galvanized iron sheeting and Toolkits, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Unit noticed "there was a marked difference between organized and non-organized communities." Existing community-based organizations had remained intact and were a major asset in organizing shelter assistance.

Because six of PPAF's partner organizations were already working in affected areas with well-established CBOs, this also contributed to a speedier response. During rehabilitation and reconstruction, the opportunity was taken to strengthen existing CBOs and to establish some new ones.

Source: Pakistan Case Study, in this Toolkit.

### United Nations and other international actors

Coordination with other agencies providing emergency response and recovery assistance is emphasized in OP 8.00. Globally, the United Nations coordinates its international response through the U.N. Emergency Response Coordinator, who is based in the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. The main in-country mechanisms by which international coordination occurs in major disaster responses is through the designated U.N. Resident Humanitarian Coordinator, national and/or regional multi-donor/agency coordination bodies, and the U.N. cluster system. Further detail about these mechanisms is provided in Annex 4.3. The exact coordination structure used will depend on the nature, scale, and context of the disaster. Understanding these structures is a key part of effective response.

#### Box 4.14 Cross-border cooperation for a regional drought response

An Inter-Agency Regional Humanitarian Strategic Framework for Southern Africa was launched in April 2005. This framework guided the humanitarian response to an impending drought crisis in the region, identifying actions required to address immediate and longer-term needs. An inter-agency contingency planning process also brought together key regional stakeholders, ensuring that participants were informed of the status of preparedness in their respective countries, and consolidated a comprehensive picture of the support expected.

*Source: Malawi Case Study, in this Toolkit.*

Social fund/CDD operations can contribute to strengthening partnerships between humanitarian and developmental actors during relief and early recovery by building the capacity of national and local governments to conduct joint humanitarian and recovery needs assessments, in collaboration with other stakeholders and aid providers in the affected country. Social fund/CDD operations can directly contribute to national and local level multi-sectoral strategic planning and coordination, as was done during the drought response planning for Malawi and the tsunami response in Aceh. They can support the development of an overall framework for working with communities, including protocols for reaching disadvantaged and underserved groups, and can encourage provincial and local authorities to use more decentralized approaches to allow NGOs and other agencies to reach the most remote and isolated affected people.

### Establishing Common Standards for Assistance

Many problems arise during relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction as a result of the use of different standards for the provision of assistance. For example, one organiza-

tion might use different selection criteria to receive housing support in a community than another organization working in a neighboring community. Social fund/CDD operations can promote the use of common standards and codes of conduct for relief and recovery to minimize problems of quality and inequity. Setting clear standards also can help all agencies to manage expectations and to ensure the transparency and accountability of assistance.

A number of international codes of conduct and sets of common standards for humanitarian aid have been developed since the 1990s. Some of the better known among these include:

- *Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*;
- *Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*;
- *People in Aid Code*; and
- *Humanitarian Accountability Project International's* NGO accreditation system.

In 2003 several donor governments—together with U.N. agencies, NGOs, and the RC/RC—also created the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. This established a set of principles and good practice, along with an implementation plan, for donors focused on donor financing, management, and accountability (GHD Principles & Plan).

The most widely (but not universally) accepted common international standards are those found in the Sphere Project's *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response* ([Sphere](#)). The Charter and Standards outline an operational framework for accountability in disaster assistance. The handbook provides minimum standards, performance indicators, checklists, and guidance notes for water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion; food security, nutrition, and food aid; shelter, settlement, and non-food items; and health services. This is in addition to identifying minimum acceptable standards common to all sectors. The Sphere handbook has been translated into multiple languages for use by local organizations, and well-developed training programs in its use operate worldwide.

Social fund/CDD operations and their in-country partner organizations that are working in countries or areas with high natural hazard risks and that may become involved in disaster response should familiarize themselves with international humanitarian laws, principles, codes of conduct, and standards. An understanding of current humanitarian system reforms by social fund/CDD managers will also facilitate more efficient and effective disaster responses.

## Mobilizing and Scaling Up Resources Quickly

### Obtaining disaster response funding

OP/ BP 8.00 allow greater speed, flexibility, and simplicity of IBRD and IDA financing responses to crises and emergencies. Once funds are redirected to an emergency operation, it becomes coded as such in the Bank's operational and financial systems, making them subject to streamlined procedures and reduced turnaround standards. Specifically, emergency operations:

- are processed under accelerated, consolidated, and simplified procedures and are subject to streamlined *ex-ante* requirements (including in fiduciary and safeguards areas);
- involve a different balance between *ex-ante* and *ex-post* controls and risk mitigation measures compared with regular operations, including on issues of fraud and corruption (which require intensified supervision support);
- may include Bank financing of up to 100 percent of the expenditures needed to meet the development objectives of such operations, including recurrent expenditures, local costs, and taxes;
- may include retroactive financing of up to 40 percent of the loan amount for payments made by the borrower not more than 12 months prior to the expected date of signing the legal documents;
- may include a quick-disbursing component designed to finance a positive list of goods required for the borrower's emergency recovery program and procured following procedures that satisfy the requirements of economy and efficiency (normally, the national emergency procurement procedures of the borrower); and
- may receive a Project Preparation Advance of up to \$5 million for start-up emergency response activities.

"To maximize Bank assistance in emergency situations, at the borrower's request the country director may approve a temporary increase in the cost-sharing limits in all Bank-financed operations in the country." (OP/BP 8.00)

The revised procedures should reduce some of the constraints faced in the past by social fund/CDD operations in quickly mobilizing and disbursing funds following a major natural disaster, including delays experienced in the release of counterpart funding. However, even with streamlined financial management procedures, it can still take four weeks to get Board approval for simple project restructuring and 10 weeks for emergency projects of a simple design, so operations must take this into account in their planning. Social fund/CDD operations often also initially use unallocated funds from projects and the overall social fund budget. An assessment should be made of progress of the current

programs against the amounts allocated by region and district, to determine where reallocation would cause minimal disruption to regular programming.

### Scaling up operations

In the event of a rapid-onset disaster or an impending slow-onset crisis, social fund/CDD operations should activate their disaster management procedures, where available.<sup>12</sup> One of the earliest decisions that will need to be made is whether the response can be managed locally or external assistance will be required.

The social fund/CDD operations in Honduras and Pakistan were able to quickly establish field offices in or near to disaster-affected areas largely using personnel from regular programs following Hurricane Mitch in 1999 and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. Operations in some other countries have worked through their existing partnerships with local and international organizations to support the rapid provision of relief to people affected by rapid-onset disasters. For example, in the Philippines NGOs involved in the KALAHI-CIDSS<sup>13</sup> program provided free services, cash, materials, and equipment donations to augment government resources following four successive tropical cyclones in 2003.

Some of the lessons learned from these experiences have been the importance of:

- Decentralizing decision-making authority to field offices so they do not experience delays in responding to immediate needs;
- Ensuring that there are sufficient staff with appropriate skills available to direct such operations, including the need to scale up and mobilize personnel quickly; and
- Establishing good internal communications between the social fund/CDD emergency operation and the Bank's other emergency and regular programming channels.

The more flexible management procedures and arrangements introduced through BP/OP 8.00 provide room for greater decentralized decision-making during an emergency operation. The main structures to be established will depend on the nature of the emergency or the declaration of a "corporate emergency" by the Bank. This can include the establishment of a Rapid Response Committee (RRC) and delegation of decision-making authority to task teams and country-based Bank officials, with delegation of authority through the Country Director to enable country-based officials to approve

<sup>12</sup> A useful resource at this time would be a checklist for disaster response preparedness. The *UN/IASC In-Country Team Self-Assessment Tool for Natural Disaster Response Preparedness* offers a practical example of such a checklist: Checklist

<sup>13</sup> Linking Arms Against Poverty-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services.

**Box 4.15 Mobilizing for a rapid response in Honduras and Pakistan**

Following the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch, the Honduras Social Investment Fund established nine temporary regional offices in less than three days. Responsibilities and resources were delegated to high-level FHIS staff members who acted as regional directors. The regional offices were authorized to approve projects of up to \$100,000 and worked closely with the municipal authorities.

The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund established a Disaster Relief Centre in Islamabad two days after a crippling earthquake struck the North West Frontier Province and Azad Jammu Kashmir. Shortly afterwards, four field coordination units were set up in the earthquake-affected areas to monitor relief distribution, carry out continuous needs assessment, and report cases of relief abuse (particularly concerning the most vulnerable people) to the relevant authorities.

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*Source:* Honduras and Pakistan Case Studies, in this Toolkit.

Project Preparation Facilities, sign legal agreements, and coordinate with sector teams. The Country Director also may elect to establish an in-country coordination committee to maintain a broader strategic focus and ensure complementarity between different components of the Bank's emergency response operation.

Where a separate sub-structure is required closer to the site of the disaster to carry out the emergency operation, the RRC, country director, or a more senior manager may need to devolve some administrative and financial powers to the unit or sub-units established. The creation of a callable roster of designated emergency staff by the Bank also should greatly reduce the administrative and financial management strain faced by past social fund/CDD operations, which had to rely largely on internal resources to run field offices. Additional operational and technical support can be provided through this roster.

The experience of some social fund/CDD operations working in slow-onset disasters is that local government partners experienced absorptive capacity challenges in the administrative and financial management of scaled-up quick response operations. For instance, audit reports from the Malawi Social Action Fund's large cash transfer—public works program consistently reported weaknesses in adhering to procurement procedures and in financial management and reporting systems by local assemblies responsible for program implementation.

In future, for both larger-scale slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters it would be desirable to base field offices or an expanded programming capability within local government structures whenever possible. This would allow closer collaboration with the

local authorities, combined with the technical and capacity-building support that may be required to implement both relief and longer-term recovery programming. Forms of support could include technical assistance for procurement, finance, engineering, and community participation during the emergency period and could be adjusted later to meet the specific needs of recovery. These can be drawn from the private as well as the public sector.

### **Getting the Right Skills**

The deployment or recruitment of local and international personnel with management skills and technical expertise in disaster response and recovery are essential to a smoothly run emergency response and recovery operation. For instance, specialists in shelter, emergency water and sanitation, and hazard-resistant infrastructure may be needed to train and supervise local technical facilitators. Additional administrative and financial staff also are likely to be needed, such as computer database operators, finance officers, and auditors to document the progress and outcomes of accelerated sub-project approval and expenditure procedures.

Several social fund/CDD operations have also emphasized the importance of having quality community facilitators. A major challenge can be scaling up partner organization and CBO staff or village facilitators to liaise between communities, local government, and project personnel for planning and implementation. For example, KDP in Indonesia had to expand its network of operations from 111 to 221 sub-districts following the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami/earthquake, requiring a substantial increase in district and sub-district consultants and elected village facilitators.

Some social fund/CDD operations have experienced difficulty in the recruitment of such staff due to a scarcity of trained personnel, delays in funding, or competition between donors. A lesson learned by the PPAF during the Pakistan earthquake operation was the importance of ensuring that personnel deployed or recruited by partner organizations receive sufficient training and on-the-job technical support on participatory community programming, gender and vulnerability analysis, and ways to promote inclusiveness. In some countries, special attention will need to be given to ensuring that recruitment processes for community-level facilitation teams attract sufficient numbers of women to ensure adequate outreach to affected women.

Program expansion should only proceed at the pace of available capacity, despite pressures that may be experienced to scale up rapidly, as untrained or unsupported new staff and volunteers may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation and create further stress for traumatized populations. Wage inflation also will need to be monitored by the operation, and a funding contingency built into human resource budgetary planning.



**Box 4.16 Expanding post-disaster community outreach**

The PPAF's Earthquake Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (E3RP) deployed Social Mobilization Teams (SMTs) through its partner organizations (47 in Azad Jammu Kashmir and 60 in North West Frontier Province). Each team was designed to include an engineer and a male and female social organizer and had responsibility for 800–1,000 households. The SMTs played a critical role in housing reconstruction by carrying out damage assessments, social mobilization, training, and quality control activities.

A constraint faced by the operation was the lack of sufficient female team members for some of the SMTs, despite the requirement to include women. This reduced the capacity of PPAF to work with vulnerable families, particularly those headed by women. Partner organizations did not appear to understand gender issues or disabled-friendly housing design. The PPAF concluded that, in future, it would be desirable to train and monitor partner organizations on vulnerability and gender issues.

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*Source:* Pakistan Case Study, in this Toolkit.

The World Bank, like many other organizations, has had to manage the budgetary implications of increasing local staff, as well as the issues associated with eventually reducing numbers. There are no easy solutions to managing staff expectations. Clarity and transparency about the duration of employment is essential, including in contracts. This should be part of an operational exit strategy that is regularly updated by all partners. Where there are large contractions in disaster-related employment occurring more broadly, transitional support and guidance also could be offered, where feasible and appropriate (e.g., time off to search for employment, skills building, and career planning).

Poaching of staff and wage inflation also are problems experienced by most organizations, including governments, in disasters where there is a strong international response. While there are no easy solutions to this problem, social fund/CDD operations could work with the head of the emergency response operation to liaise with national government on policies and measures to control wage inflation during emergency operations.

The 2004–05 *ALNAP Annual Review* reported that the success or failure of relief operations is largely dependent on staff quality. In several emergencies, international agency personnel on the ground have often felt unsupported. Many had insufficient time to prepare for departure and only limited briefings. Recent experience has shown the value of setting aside dedicated time within operations to address progress, consider staff support needs, and promote dialogue between field and headquarters personnel (Beck, 2005b). Also, some local and international staff may become affected or “burned

out” from disaster response work. Resilience varies among individuals, and this must be monitored. UNHCR’s *Handbook for Emergencies* provides some general guidance on identifying and managing such issues.

### **Expediting Procurement and Legal Processing**

BP 8.00 allows World Bank emergency operations to undertake simplified and expedited procurement, including using the disaster-affected country’s emergency procurement system. The degree to which that system is compatible with social fund/CDD decentralized community-based procurement models will need to be assessed to determine which the fastest and most efficient route is. If the government does not have emergency procurement procedures, it is necessary to establish a protocol—preferably prior to a disaster event. This reflects a lesson learned by some social fund/CDD operations that it was difficult to persuade government partners to return to regular procurement procedures once the emergency was over. A few social fund/CDD operations have developed operational guidelines or procedure manuals for emergencies, based on their experience (e.g., FHIS, PPAF, KDP). This represents good practice in disaster preparedness.

The following measures have been used by some social fund/CDD operations to speed up the sub-project approval and procurement processes during emergency operations:

- Using simplified and standardized sub-project proposal pro forms;
- Waiving funding ceilings and instead determining the level of funding based on the actual amount of damage;
- Waiving or lowering the community contributions for sub-projects in areas badly affected by disaster (including for regular developmental activities);
- Shortening the procurement process (e.g., the process in Honduras was decreased from 50 to 8 steps);
- Simplifying the procurement rules, such as shorter deadlines for bid invitations (changing from open competition bidding, which would take longer), selection of small and medium-size enterprises on a smaller bid invitation basis, and use of sole source procedures for partners already active in a disaster-affected area;
- Diversifying the number of directly contracted executing partners;
- Contracting and procuring directly by the social fund rather than by communities; and
- Undertaking technical audits during implementation to allow the rapid reorientation of procedures, if needed.

It should be noted that some social fund/CDD operations have found that using the existing processes for procurement and disbursement has been more efficient and helped with quality control, as the communities and local government agencies were familiar with and trusted them. This has been more the case with slow-onset

**Box 4.17 Speeding up procurement in Honduras during an emergency**

Implementation support in the field from the regional procurement advisor (RPA) ensured rapid implementation. Having the RPA on the ground during the initial stage of the operation, in addition to an engineering consultant, had a tremendous impact on expediting the process within the country and in gaining internal Bank support for streamlined procedures and processes.

With the Country Director's and RPA's support, procurement processes and contracting began immediately, providing a "comfort letter" to the contractor, ensuring that funds to pay for goods and works was forthcoming, prior to amending credit agreements and seeking Board approval.

Large-scale contracts using direct contracting or sole source, shopping for goods over an agreed timeframe, and covering specific or immediate emergency operation made rapid implementation possible. Sole source or direct contracting did not depend on the size of the contract but was based on the gravity of the emergency and the relative necessity of speed in the immediate response to recovery efforts. For example, sole source was used to purchase goods such as immediately operational military-type Bailey Bridges.

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*Source: Honduras Case Study, in this Toolkit.*

disasters, but it indicates the importance of returning to normal procedures as soon as feasible.

Where the procedures are temporarily changed during an emergency, confusion can arise within government. Such changes need to be well communicated to officials at all levels, and the support of financial and administrative personnel may be needed to help local governments adjust and streamline their normal procedures. Likewise, if funds are reallocated from existing projects to emergency operations, it is important that the restructuring of the funding is reflected in the revised project objectives and legal agreement. During the FHIS response to Hurricane Mitch, this was not done, leading to a poor evaluation of a restructured environmental development project.

**Managing Fiduciary Risks**

To address the risks associated with the need for speed in processing and implementing emergency operations, World Bank task teams are now required to provide more intensive supervision (OP/BP 8.00). To ensure adequate support to operations, task teams can draw from designated emergency staff from the regions (legal, financial management, loan, procurement, and safeguards). During larger operations, the presence of additional personnel who can interpret the changed programming context and liaise with head office legal advisers to resolve more complex issues can greatly

increase the operation's efficiency. This was demonstrated by the experience of FHIS in Honduras. The embedding of some technical expertise within local government counterpart agencies to support their handling of higher and more complex workloads associated with relief and recovery operations also should help.

Unless an emergency is protracted, the delivery of relief and early recovery assistance usually should not last for more than six months. Given the volatile nature of rapid-onset disasters, progress reporting over the emergency period likely will need to be frequent (e.g., weekly or monthly) and shared with all the stakeholders. Module 6 provides further information on the establishment of management information systems, audit procedures and community-based monitoring and evaluation systems to act as project safeguards during emergency operations.

## Further Resources

Below are some of the major resources available on this topic. For bibliographical information on the documents and other resources cited in this Module, please see the References section at the end of the Toolkit.

### Documents

Alam K, Herson M and O'Donnell I (2008). *Flood Disasters: Learning from Previous Relief and Recovery Operations*. Geneva/London: ProVention/ALNAP. Flood lessons

Cosgrave J (2008). *Responding to Earthquakes: Learning from Earthquake Relief and Recovery Operations*. Geneva/London: ProVention/ALNAP. <http://www.alnap.org/publications/ALNAPLessonsEarthquakes.doc>

Harvey P (2005). *Cash and Vouchers in Emergencies*. London: ODI/HPG. Harvey paper

Hedlund K (2008). *Slow-onset Disasters: Drought and Food and Livelihoods Insecurity: Learning from Previous Relief and Recovery Responses*. Geneva/London: ProVention/ALNAP. article

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2007). *Disaster Response and Contingency Planning Guide*. Geneva: IFRC. IFRC contingency

Longley C, Christoplos I, and Slaymaker T (2006). *Agricultural Rehabilitation: Mapping the Linkages between Humanitarian Relief, Social Protection and Development*. London: ODI/ HPG Report 21. <http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/hpgreport22.pdf>

Savage K and Harvey P (2007). *Remittances during Crises: Implications for Humanitarian Response, Briefing Paper 26*. London: ODI. [hpgbrief26](#)

Sphere (2004). *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Geneva: The Sphere Project. Sphere standards

UN/Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2007). *Initial Rapid Assessment Tool: Guidance Notes*. Geneva: UN/IASC Health/Nutrition/WASH Clusters. WASH/Nutrition guidelines

——— (2006). *Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters: IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disaster*. Geneva: UN/IASC. Guidelines

——— (2006). *Women, Girls, Boys and Men: Different Needs – Equal Opportunities: Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action*. Geneva: IASC. *Gender Handbook*

### Web Sites

Overseas Development Institute: Humanitarian Practice Network: <http://www.odi.org.uk/HPG/>

The Humanitarian Policy Group is a team of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue, and debate. It conducts integrated research, as well as publishing policy briefs and the *Disasters* journal.

ProVention Consortium: <http://www.proventionconsortium.org>

The ProVention Consortium is a global coalition of international organizations, governments, the private sector, civil society organizations, and academic institutions dedicated to increasing the safety of vulnerable communities and to reducing the impacts of disasters in developing countries. Among other things, ProVention develops innovative approaches to the practical applications of disaster risk management and shares knowledge and resources for organizations, practitioners, and communities.

UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Clusters: [www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/cluster/](http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/cluster/)

Endorsed by the IASC in 2005, the Cluster Approach aims to ensure sufficient global capacity, predictable leadership, strengthened accountability, and improved strategic field-level coordination and prioritization in humanitarian response to crises. The approach is designed around the concept of partnerships between U.N. agencies, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international organizations, and NGOs. Partners work together toward agreed common humanitarian objectives both at the global level (preparedness, standards, tools, stockpiles, and capacity-building) and at the field level (assessment, plan-

ning, delivery, and monitoring). There are several cluster working groups covering areas such as shelter; water sanitation and hygiene, etc. They produce guidance on good practice in humanitarian response.



# **MODULE 5**





## Longer-Term Disaster Recovery (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction)

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### Module Summary

*Module 5 provides guidance on key issues in longer-term post-disaster recovery (rehabilitation and reconstruction). The range of forms and methods for social fund/CDD operations to deliver recovery assistance are described, with a focus on: the restoration of communal assets, livelihoods, shelter/housing; and natural resources. Actions to incorporate disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation activities into recovery programming are discussed within this context. The module concludes with information on the integration of recovery programming into regular social fund/CDD operations.*

## ■ Key Principles of Longer-Term Disaster Recovery

Disaster recovery (rehabilitation and reconstruction) refers to the decisions and actions taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving the pre-disaster living conditions of the stricken community while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk. Recovery provides an opportunity to develop and apply disaster risk reduction measures (UN/ISDR, 2004). Alongside the provision of life-saving emergency relief and quick-impact measures to protect or replace key small-scale productive assets and income of poor and vulnerable households and communities, planning must begin for longer-term recovery.


Recovery can encompass a wide range of activities, such as the rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, water supply and sanitation systems, and electricity supply); of facilities such as schools, hospitals, and health centers; of irrigation systems and farmland; of housing and settlements; and of livelihoods. It includes restoring the facilities and capacity of governments, the private sector, and civil society. Recovery also entails helping communities find ways to cope with the socio-economic and psychosocial impacts of the disaster.

When a natural disaster strikes in a poor community, not only does it cause serious loss of life and property, it often takes away or threatens the livelihoods and future of those who have survived. This is especially the case where productive household members have been lost or permanently disabled. For a large number of households, not only will their short-term economic and social vulnerability be increased, but their ability to cope with future shocks also may be eroded. These pressures can contribute to increased poverty and marginalization in society. They can aggravate tensions or conflicts that may have already existed within or between communities prior to the disaster.

In the case of slow-onset or regularly recurring hazard events or shocks, many poor communities live in a constant state of recovery, where temporary relief has become a permanent coping strategy. For example, in Malawi drought occurs with such frequency that people have little time to recover before another drought hits. This has resulted in deepening poverty, chronic food insecurity, and aid dependency.

For these reasons, recovery programs need to tackle both transient and chronic poverty issues, requiring both social protection and economic activities. In order to be effective and sustainable, longer-term recovery initiatives should be linked to national and local development processes and to an understanding of the economic, social, and political conditions that existed prior to the disaster. Some of these are likely to have been contributing factors to the vulnerability that led to the disaster; others may have an impact

Figure 5.1: The crisis process



Source : ICRC, 2005b, p. 8.

on the recovery strategies adopted, such as underlying structural issues. Lack of understanding of these processes can lead to poorly targeted and inappropriate assistance. Social fund/CDD operations can bring a valuable longer-term developmental perspective, as well as directly contribute to the social protection and economic development elements of recovery. Social funds/CDD operations also have more opportunities to incorporate the lessons learned from disaster responses than some humanitarian NGOs that only work in-country during an emergency relief response.

Recovery activities also should do more than merely restore disaster-affected people and institutions back to the situation that existed before the disaster. They should contribute to strengthening the capacity of communities and governments to reduce their vulnerability to future hazards and shocks; they could restore destroyed man-groves as protection against storm surges, for instance, or develop the disaster management skills of local government authorities.

## Possible Areas for Social Fund/CDD Operation Support

### Restoring Communal Assets

Social fund/CDD operations have a long history of supporting community sub-projects to restore important community infrastructure after disasters, such as schools, roads, health centers, and irrigation systems. The various forms of community block grants and local contracting systems developed over years of operation make social fund/

### Box 5.1 The consequences of poorly planned recovery

The response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and earthquake successfully avoided the traditional funding gap between the relief and recovery phase, due to the early access of agencies to large sums of money for recovery projects. Despite this achievement, the perceived pressure to spend, the competition for “beneficiaries,” and a lack of expertise in sustainable livelihoods, community development, resource management, and engagement with government processes led to the following results for a number of organizations:

- Poor market research leading to inappropriate business models
- Environmental damage to forestry, topsoil (Alexander, 2006), and fish stocks
- Poor access to credit
- Faulty or badly planned boat production
- Poor-quality reconstruction
- Inflation-inducing profligacy
- Poor anticipation of skills shortages and inadequate training, leading to outsiders meeting the demand for labor, instead of promoting local employment opportunities
- Poor targeting, leading to waste and social tensions (such as people who are not really fishers receiving boats, sometimes more than one, while fisherfolk have been left empty-handed)
- Fragmented programming resulting in houses without connection to water and sanitation, schools where few or no children now attend, and fishing boats and nets where there is neither cold storage nor potential buyers.

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*Source:* Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Synthesis Report, 2006, pp. 71–72.

CDD operations well suited to support demand-driven small-scale infrastructure as well as other safety nets operations such as public works programs.

Clearly, the potential social and economic costs of not investing in hazard-proofing of key structures and infrastructure for high-probability hazard risks outweigh the costs

### Box 5.2 Use of block grants by communities in Aceh Province, Indonesia

During 2005, Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) communities in Aceh chose to invest 86.2 percent of their block grants in small-scale rural infrastructure such as roads, bridges, clean water supply, irrigation, and canals. About 1.6 percent of total funds were allocated to economic activities, including revolving funds for women and soft loans to groups for small businesses and agriculture. For education, KDP communities allocated 5.9 percent of their funds to school construction and renovation, scholarships, and the purchase of school materials. Health facilities such as pre- and post-natal clinics and general village clinics received about 1 percent of the funds allocated.

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*Source:* Indonesia Case Study, in this Toolkit.

of spending funds on ensuring their safety and durability. In many (but not all) cases, the modifications required are simple and inexpensive, such as incorporating cross-bracing into buildings to protect them from wind or raising structures above flood-lines. Indigenous knowledge can play an important role in identifying locally feasible and cost-effective solutions. Bangladeshi communities, for example, have devised simple methods for protecting their homes against floods and wind, such as raised plinths (the base, foundation, or lower part of a house) or detachable wall panels that can be moved to the roof (Twigg, 2004).

Where agencies have undertaken hazard-proofing, a common experience is that they only do it for the hazard event that most recently took place or for hazards with a low probability of occurring. This can increase the opportunity costs and risks. For example, a building may be strengthened to resist earthquakes when the most commonly experienced hazards are cyclones. Decisions to incorporate hazard-resistant measures into construction or to retrofit key facilities (e.g., schools and hospitals) should be based on careful assessment of the communities' degree of vulnerability to different hazards rather than on the hazards themselves. This includes undertaking risk and cost-benefit analysis.

Social fund/CDD operations need to make hazard-resistant construction a requirement for all structural works, whether pre- or post-disaster, and to incorporate this into the objectives and performance measurement system for sub-projects.

Steps undertaken to ensure appropriate, adequate, and cost-effective hazard-proofing include:

- Ascertain the hazards of highest risk to communities;
- Review local/national building codes, policies, and practices;
- Recruit appropriate technical expertise to design infrastructure/facilities with hazard-proof features;

### Box 5.3 Protecting schools and health centers in Madagascar

Starting in mid-2004 the Madagascar Social Fund, *Fond d'Intervention pour le Développement* (FID), undertook the construction or rehabilitation of schools and health centers to make them resistant to cyclones with winds of up to 250 kilometers an hour. From 2004 to 2006, some 2,041 school buildings and 311 basic health centers were built to comply with these anti-cyclone codes (UNISDR 2006).

Source: Madagascar Case Study, in this Toolkit

- Train technical facilitators and construction personnel in how to build in these features; and
- Monitor and supervise construction, including an independent technical audit and safety certification process.

The longer-term focus should be on building local capacity to carry out this work independently.

The rehabilitation of water supply and sanitation systems is usually a significant recovery need after a rapid-onset disaster.<sup>1</sup> However, quite often these systems are not built back to account for local conditions, such as recurrent flooding. For instance, following flooding in Nicaragua the construction of latrines increased. But when local rivers swelled to high levels, the latrines became a source of contamination (Oxfam, 2003).

Social fund/CDD operations can incorporate flood mitigation measures while rehabilitating water, sanitation, and health systems for future protection. Some of these include:

- Strengthening health volunteer networks to enhance their effectiveness in emergency preparedness and response;
- Raising tube-wells and boreholes above flood water level to prevent contamination;

#### Box 5.4 Communities monitor water quality after a cyclone

Following Cyclone Ami in Fiji in 2003, the drinking-water quality on the island of Vanua Levu did not conform to World Health Organization guidelines values for safe drinking water. Turbidity and total coliform levels significantly increased (up 56 and 62 percent, respectively) from pre-cyclone levels, which was likely due to the large amounts of silt and debris entering water-supply sources during the cyclone. The local utility found it difficult to maintain a reliable supply of treated water in the aftermath of the disaster, and communities were unaware they were drinking water that had not been adequately treated. A simple paper-strip water-quality test (the hydrogen sulfide, H<sub>2</sub>S) kit was distributed for community-based monitoring as a pilot test. It was concluded that the H<sub>2</sub>S test would be well suited to wider use, as it is inexpensive and easy to use, thus enabling communities and community health workers with minimal training to test their own water supplies without outside assistance. It was recommended that this be accompanied by public health education.

Source: Mosley, Sharp, and Singh, 2003.

<sup>1</sup> This discussion draws directly on Alam, Herson, and O'Donnell, 2008, p. 10.



- Paying attention to placement and arrangement of sanitary facilities to limit impact on groundwater and ensure safety for community members;
- Using innovative approaches to sanitation in flooded areas, such as raised latrines, pitliners or rings, sealed pits or tanks, or contained leach fields; and
- Extending hygiene education to schools and community groups.

Social fund/CDD sub-projects can consider increasing their range of eligible non-structural disaster mitigation activities to include the strengthening of livelihoods assets, such as introduction of fuel stove technology to reduce the use of firewood or participatory hygiene and sanitation activities to complement the installation of “hardware” systems (Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2008), as has been done in the Second Water Supply and Sanitation of Low Income Communities Project in Indonesia.

### Livelihoods

In the longer-term, post-disaster livelihoods assistance should continue to focus on the social protection of the poorest and most vulnerable households, combined with measures to increase the productivity of their livelihood activities and to diversify household income sources. This will help to increase their resilience to future disasters.

For disaster-affected communities, livelihoods are generally the key recovery issue. Disasters can have an impact on household livelihoods through (Cosgrave, 2008):

- Loss of human capital through death, injury, or psychological impact;
- Loss of assets including land, livestock, and shops;
- Loss of employment, either in formal economy or the informal sector; and
- Loss of markets or access to them.

Households also will weigh up the opportunity cost of participating in recovery assistance programs. For example, poor women may have to choose between providing labor to restore an access road and restoring their home garden.

### Social protection

To avoid creating aid dependencies, social protection activities (see “Protection and Restoration of Livelihoods” in Module 4) should be gradually reduced and ended for vulnerable households for whom the disaster has been a one-off idiosyncratic event. For the chronically poor and food-insecure, and for those on the verge of moving from transient to chronic poverty, a reliable transfer of resources may still be required, while undertaking programs to reduce long-term vulnerability.

To continue to build up household income and assets during the recovery period, social fund/CDD operations can maximize the use of local skills, labor, and materials when restoring housing and communal assets. This includes identifying support roles, such as providing meals or drinking water to the workers, for those with less strength or mobility (e.g., disabled or elderly). Housing reconstruction may sometimes be a sufficiently strong vehicle to promote more general economic recovery, as happened after the Yogyakarta earthquake (Mansfield, 2007).

### Market analysis

Surprisingly little market analysis is carried out by agencies to determine the pre-and post-disaster trends in demand for goods and services. Social fund/CDD operations can help government or the private sector conduct such surveys in order to determine where best to invest in business and employment creation. This information can provide important guidance as to whether people should be encouraged to continue with the same occupations or be equipped for a different means of earning a living or whether income sources can be diversified. For example, an oversupply of fishing boats in Aceh Province after the 2004 tsunami put added pressure on fish stocks that had been declining prior to the disaster and increased pre-existing vulnerabilities (Christoplos, 2006b).

Market surveys can also correct a tendency among some agencies to view the livelihoods of poor households in overly simplistic ways—farmer, fisher, trader—rather than seeing the diverse set of productive activities usually undertaken. They can further develop strategies for the urban poor and vulnerable, who may, for example, have depended on one job in a factory or an office that has now collapsed. Market analysis also may help identify appropriate education and training opportunities to help individuals diversify their income sources or move into new occupations when they have lost a means of living or it is under threat due to changing markets or climate change.

Social fund/CDD operations can greatly facilitate appropriately targeted livelihoods recovery by undertaking coordinated market research activities, working with agencies like the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization and sharing the results widely with other agencies engaged in recovery activities.

### Savings, credit and insurance

The development of programs in these areas can help recovery and future risk management among poor and vulnerable disaster-affected households in a variety of ways. Households can use production or investment credit to build up assets and increase their future capacity to self-insure. They then can use precautionary savings or credit to smooth consumption in the face of either income shocks or anticipated variations in income or expenditures (e.g., dowries, weddings, or funerals). Social fund/CDD operations could expand their current focus on micro-credit institutions and savings

societies to include working through traditional community coping mechanisms such as burial societies (Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2008).

The Bosnia and Herzegovina Local Initiatives Project, operating in a post-conflict situation, created almost 200,000 jobs through the provision of microcredit services. Within three to five years the micro-credit organizations contracted under the project were able to quadruple their active clients to about 100,000, to reduce their interest rate by half, and to cut their portfolio at risk to 1 percent (IDA, 2007). And in India, as a result of specially targeted initiatives of the Andhra Pradesh District Poverty Initiative Program more than 1.2 million rural poor have taken up death and disability insurance coverage, up from fewer than 1,000 before the project (IDA, 2007).

These kinds of results also are possible in post-disaster programs, as illustrated by the experience of the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). As a part of its cash-for-work emergency public works program, MASAF encouraged beneficiaries to form Community Savings and Investment Groups (COMSIP) to facilitate the purchase of agricultural inputs. The program instilled a cooperative culture and links to financial institutions. Usually assets were sold off during droughts, but this pattern changed with COMSIP (Case Study: Malawi Social Action Fund, in this Toolkit).

### Other

Other activities can be undertaken to strengthen livelihoods resilience and facilitate adaptation to climate change, many of which are already being done through social fund/CDD operations, such as promoting flood or drought-resistant crop varieties and building strengthened pens and trap ponds to retain fish during floods.<sup>2</sup>

### *Shelter, Housing, and Human Settlements*

Large-scale rapid onset disasters can cause widespread devastation to people's homes and community infrastructure. Shelter is critical to survival and a high priority both for relief and recovery assistance. From the emergency phase until durable solutions, it is necessary to provide families with security and personal safety as well as to protect them from exposure to the elements (e.g. rain, snow, extreme heat or cold, etc) and associated health risks. Shelter and settlements serve the important function of supporting human dignity and family and community life, as well as maximizing communal coping strategies, whether people are living on the site of their damaged or destroyed homes or have been displaced (The Sphere Project, 2004). More secure shelter in a

<sup>2</sup> In 2008 the SEEP Network published useful guidance on the promotion of enterprises, employment, cash flow, and asset management with conflict or disaster affected businesses and households. SEEP standards

### Box 5.5 Key Shelter Definitions

*Emergency shelter:* The provision of basic and immediate shelter necessary to ensure the survival of disaster-affected persons, including “rapid response” solutions such as tents, insulation materials, other temporary emergency shelter solutions, and shelter-related non-food items (UN/IASC Emergency Shelter Cluster, 2006).

*Transitional shelter:* Shelter that provides a habitable covered living space and a secure, healthy living environment, with privacy and dignity for those within it, during the period between a conflict or natural disaster and the achievement of a durable shelter solution (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005).

*Durable solutions:* The point at which permanent settlement and shelter for both displaced and non-displaced populations have been rebuilt and established, sufficient for communities to support their own livelihoods (UN/OCHA/Shelter Centre, DFID, 2008).

safer settlement constitutes the immediate and sustainable physical foundation to livelihoods development, including by enabling protection and reducing risk (UN/UN-OCHA, 2008).

Despite the importance of shelter, housing, and human settlements, this sector has a mixed track record in post-disaster recovery. While there have been notable achievements in some countries, in many cases inappropriate assistance has been provided, such as providing tents for emergency shelter when tools, building materials, or cash would have been more appropriate; designing houses that were culturally inappropriate or difficult to maintain; neglecting to install essential services or infrastructure such as water and sanitation; not allowing space for home-based businesses, gardens, or livestock; neglecting important community infrastructure such as community centers, schools, and houses of worship; relocating displaced people to settlements far from their sources of income or social support networks; and missing the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in targeting the assistance (UN-OCHA/Shelter Centre/DFID, 2008; World Bank/IEG; 2006a; Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton, 2006; ProVention/ALNAP, 2005-08).

Some of the reasons for these difficulties have included:

- Structural obstacles such as unclear housing compensation and reconstruction policies;
- Land and property rights issues, especially for those who do not hold secure tenure, compounded by loss of documentation during a major rapid-onset disaster;
- Lack of understanding of the socio-political context of land use in the affected country;

- Focusing on the physical house itself rather than housing as part of a human settlement with associated infrastructure and services;
- Lack of attention to livelihoods and social cohesion needs in the choices of location and design, particularly where there is no other option but relocation;
- Not accounting for the needs, concerns, cultural, and equity (e.g., if new arrivals receive higher-quality housing and services than current residents) considerations of communities in which displaced households may be integrated or placed alongside;
- Absence or limited consultation with and participation of affected communities in the design, implementation, and quality control of housing and settlements;
- Bypassing poor and marginalized communities in consultative processes;
- Missing key vulnerable groups in assistance planning, such as host families providing temporary accommodation for displaced households;
- Use of poor quality materials, construction techniques, or contractors;
- Lack of environmental impact or risk assessment;
- Lack of quality control systems and procedures; and
- Corruption, coercion, or political influences on shelter and housing choices.

The process of sheltering is about much more than the physical (re)construction of buildings. It has economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions that require a sound understanding both of the local context in which assistance is being provided and the needs and preferences of affected households and communities. The UN-OCHA, Shelter Centre, and DFID recently released guidelines on *Transitional Settlement and Reconstruction after Natural Disasters* (Guidelines), which provides in-depth guidance on a wide range of issues and considerations in shelter and housing. This includes 10 key principles for shelter assistance, drawn from extensive international experience (Annex 5.1).

From the World Bank's perspective, the goal of shelter and housing assistance is to help those made homeless by disaster get back on their feet as quickly as possible, while focusing on the poorest and encouraging mitigation measures to help reduce the impact of future disasters (World Bank/IEG, 2006). The Bank has played a major role in helping disaster-affected countries finance transitional shelter and longer-term housing and human settlements rehabilitation and reconstruction. This has ranged from facilitating self-help construction of temporary shelter, while simultaneously undertaking housing reconstruction programs, to providing households with cash or materials to repair or rebuild themselves. Assistance has also been provided to relocate disaster survivors when the areas in which they were previously living have been deemed unsafe for habitation.

The Bank has supported activities to set up emergency refuges on site and strengthened early warning systems. For example, in Bangladesh the construction of cyclone

shelters was funded, providing Bangladeshis at risk with a place to go during severe storms. Sea-level monitoring and warning systems were also implemented (World Bank/IEG, 2006a).

Social fund/CDD operations have contributed and can continue to contribute to positive sheltering outcomes for the poor and vulnerable in several important ways.

### Vulnerability and needs assessment

Social funds can help local governments assess community vulnerabilities, needs, capacities, and preferences for shelter/housing support and carry out a process of community-based planning for assistance. This includes obtaining information on the livelihoods-related, environmental, and land and property rights considerations for settlement planning (Annex 5.2 summarizes livelihoods and shelter linkages). After the 2004 tsunami and earthquakes in Aceh, for example, participation helped ensure that important features, such as water and sanitation, were incorporated into housing design (Oxfam 2006).

### Support for policy development

Technical support and community data can be provided to local and national governments for the development of clear and flexible shelter and housing policies that meet the varied needs of the affected population, including vulnerable groups, while improving hazard resistance. Support also can be provided for the development of frameworks for entitlements and assistance.

#### Box 5.6 Incorporating land and property rights into shelter/housing assessments

The following information should be collected to determine land tenure considerations in planning:

- Number of parcels of land affected and extent of registration in the formal land administration system
- Numbers of landowners affected; numbers of dead and missing
- Extent of destruction of land and personal identity records
- Degree of landholding and landlessness among displaced persons
- Number of renters and informal or illegal settlers displaced
- Number of women displaced or renters or residents of informal settlements
- Number of female-headed households among displaced and non-displaced
- Assess operation of land institutions prior to disaster, including efficiency and effectiveness in ensuring tenure security, access to land, and protection of human rights relating to housing, land, and property
- Response of land institutions to disaster

Source: UN-OCHA/Shelter Centre/DFID, 2008, p. 229.

### Settlement planning

The 2006 Independent Evaluation Group report noted the difficulties in resettlement programs. Due to the severe negative impacts that relocation can have on community livelihoods and social cohesion/coping mechanisms, relocation should only be considered as an option when there is no other alternative to ensure the physical safety of communities. The World Bank has safeguards procedures in place for assessing displacement issues, and these need to be carefully followed where a natural disaster has caused either temporary or permanent displacement. If relocation is assessed as the only safe option, then special attention must be paid to the location and settlement planning (refer to principles #4 and #5 for transitional settlement and reconstruction in Annex 5.1).

Social fund/CDD operations can provide facilitation between government, contractors (where used), and communities in designing settlements that include important community services (roads, water and sanitation, schools and health centers, security lighting, etc) and facilities that promote social cohesion (community centers, places of worship, parks, playgrounds, etc). This may also include the integration of livelihoods support into planning, as was done in the Ecuador El Niño Emergency Recovery Project.

### Cash transfers for transitional housing or home repair

The Bank, through social fund/CDD operations and other mechanisms, has provided grants to households to create or rent transitional accommodation or to carry out home repairs, where feasible. Evaluations and beneficiary surveys have indicated that recipients were satisfied with this assistance and preferred it to material support, as it gave speed, choice, and dignity (World Bank/IEG, 2006a).

These transfers work well if a good distribution structure exists and if local markets are functional (World Bank/IEG, 2006a). Social fund/CDD operations could consider incorporating the provision of payments through existing community grant structures. Assistance to local governments, partner organizations, and communities with vulnerability targeting—for example, to ensure that groups such as the disabled and the elderly are assisted with buying supplies or undertaking repairs—and monitoring to minimize the risks of misappropriation or elite capture of the benefits is another important role, as was done following the Marmara earthquake in Turkey.

It is also important to note that cash transfer schemes based on home ownership often miss vulnerable people without land title, such as squatters, unregistered migrants, and female-headed households. For example, following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake the government provided a compensation payment to house owners whose homes had been destroyed. One report observed that landlords, who had themselves suffered financial losses from the earthquake, were reluctant to use the money to rebuild accommodation occupied by tenants. In other cases, landlords collected compensa-

tion for damage to their tenants' homes but passed only a fraction of this money to the tenant (Adams and Harvey, 2006). Beneficiary selection criteria need to be developed with careful attention to inclusiveness issues.

Some situations will arise where the local markets are temporarily not functioning well (e.g., in floods) or easily accessible to affected people (e.g., those with restricted mobility). In such cases, support may need to be provided in the form of tools, materials, and other items (blankets, kitchen sets, etc.) to construct safe and habitable shelters from the rubble. This assistance should be provided through established commodity relief channels and processes (see "Provision of Relief Items" in Module 4). The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) directly supplied transitional shelter tools and materials to hard-to-reach mountain communities following the earthquake there.

Whether cash or commodities are provided, technical support may be required to guide communities on safe transitional structure construction, and arrangements may need to be made to help those who do not have the physical capacity to purchase or transport materials or build a temporary structure.

### Owner-driven housing construction

Social fund/CDD operations also can provide funding and technical and community facilitation support to owner self-build schemes for permanent housing, as was done by the PPAF. Owner-driven housing usually entails a system of tranced payments for reconstruction or repair of housing, carried out by home-owners themselves or contractors they have engaged. Standards for the incorporation of hazard-resistance are

#### Box 5.7 Community local government participation in owner-driven rebuilding in Gujarat

The Gujarat Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program Project (GEERPP) aimed to promote sustainable recovery in areas affected by the 2001 earthquake and to lay the foundation for sustainable disaster management capacity in Gujarat. The main component of the project was an owner-driven permanent housing construction and house repair program.

Through another component, village level sub-centers were established to build capacity for earthquake-resistant construction and to form self-help groups to monitor the program and be responsible for disaster preparedness in the future. This was supplemented by information, education, and communication activities, along with gender sensitization workshops for those working with the affected communities. A community-based disaster preparedness program also was initiated, and local government mechanisms to undertake social audits were strengthened.

Source: World Bank, GEERPP Project Identification Document (undated).



established in advance and technical guidance/education is provided to home-owners, contractors, and craftspeople. Inspections take place at each pre-determined stage of the work before the next tranche of payment is released to ensure that the work has been completed and conforms to standards.

The 2006 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) report noted that owner-driven reconstruction was faster than agency-driven reconstruction in countries affected by the 2004 tsunami, despite the low levels of subsidy it received (de Ville de Goyet and Morinière, 2006). In Gujarat, a study found that client satisfaction and perceptions of post-earthquake housing quality were highest for owner-driven housing schemes (Duyne-Barenstein, 2006). However, owner-built housing may not be appropriate in situations where homes are rented, as is the case for many poor urban apartment dwellers, or where owner-built housing is not the pre-disaster norm.<sup>3</sup> Inflationary effects in the construction industry also must be gauged, as this has reduced the value of payments and delayed rebuilding in some cases.

Even where owner-driven housing reconstruction is undertaken, it is important to ensure that required supporting infrastructure and essential services also are rehabilitated or rebuilt within a settlement planning framework, such as access roads, water and sanitation, and schools.

In addition, like cash transfers for transitional shelter, vulnerability targeting and monitoring is required. In Gujarat, the Emergency Earthquake Reconstruction Program Project specifically conducted gender sensitization workshops for those working with the affected communities.

### Land titling

Many poor and marginalized people face various barriers to obtaining land and property rights. Housing construction projects can offer an opportunity to recognize their formal ownership of this important asset, one that may be used to gain access to credit for other productive activities. For example, in many developing countries women are not allowed to own land or houses. Some Bank projects have elevated women's status in society by providing land titles in the names of both men and women, as was done in Maharashtra. Unprecedented in this region, even widows received houses in their own names and ex-gratia payments for lost relatives (World Bank/IEG, 2006a). Social fund/CDD projects can promote more equitable land titling and property rights for the poor and marginalized.

<sup>3</sup> The UN-OCHA transitional shelter guidelines offer comprehensive advice on multiple forms of agency-driven housing and settlement planning and construction for situations where cash-based approaches are not an option.

### Information, education, and communication on hazard-resistant construction

Grant recipients and the builders that they use also need education and training on hazard-resistant construction. The development of the training approach and package should involve local builders and craftspeople and incorporate indigenous knowledge of safe building techniques. Efforts should be made to ensure that women are included, as they often play roles in house construction and maintenance that are not acknowledged. Women in the earthquake-affected areas of Pakistan, for instance, are responsible for plastering walls and various interior work (Burton, unpublished).

Awareness-raising and skills building can be done through a combination of formal training and on-the-job technical support, supplemented by written or visual material suitable to the literacy levels (including technical literacy) of the communities involved. For example, through the PPAF E3RP, 194 partner organization engineers and social organizers were trained as trainers and 249 craftspeople became master trainers. Over 14,000 craftspeople had skill upgrading training and more than 75,000 homeowners received orientation training on government earthquake-resistant construction guidelines (World Bank PPAF case study, forthcoming).

Reconstruction usually provides at least a temporary stimulus to the labor market, often contributing to wage inflation for certain occupations. There may be opportunities to train individuals in construction-related skills and increase their earning capacity.

**Table 5.1 Communicating Building for Safety**

Communication in planning	Respect local knowledge and aspirations Involve the beneficiaries at all stages Before trying to teach, find out how people learn
Educational materials	Concentrate on one or two essential messages Adapt educational techniques locally Identify clear targets and educational contexts Use demonstration buildings or models Invest in staff
Illustrating building for safety	Draw literally, as people unused to reading pictures will interpret the images very literally Avoid abstraction Use three dimensions Stress relevant detail and avoid unnecessary detail Avoid unfamiliar symbols and conventions and explain symbols Only use cartoons if understood and not seen as patronizing Where possible, avoid connections and sequences, as images are generally read individually Cultural associations: identify the codes of respectability and avoid things that are alien
Pre-production testing	Always test new materials with representative samples of the target audience

Source: UN-OCHA/Shelter Centre/DFID, 2008, p. 257.

### Box 5.8 Community training in hazard-resistant construction in Yogyakarta

Following the 2006 Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquake, the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) implemented a cash-based owner self-build transitional shelter program. This was the highest priority need identified by communities. With the help of local craftspeople, the technical faculties of a local university, and a consultant specializing in bamboo construction, a prototype was developed for a transitional shelter that met safety standards, was made of local materials and could be built in less than a week for under \$200. The design of the prototype underwent several rounds of development to bring it to a stage where non-skilled community members could easily build it themselves.

An illustrated guide on how to construct the shelter was developed and tested before being distributed to communities. PMI volunteers were also trained in how to build a demonstration model for each village. The volunteers were then able to provide technical assistance to community members if they faced problems building their own shelters. Mobile construction clinics were set up, in collaboration with the university, to disseminate information on hazard-resistant building techniques, including responding to community queries on the retrofitting of existing houses.

*Source: IFRC, 2007, unpublished draft.*

This can include training of vulnerable women in non-traditional areas such as block and tile making, as was successfully done in Aceh Province through the ILO (Vianen, 2006).

### Monitoring and quality control

Quality control systems for housing construction have been established by having a limited number of approved designs and a set of strict design rules or by providing design advice and quality control. Independent inspectors then verify the standard of the work. It is important that uniform standards are set by government and applied, as differences can lead to tensions between or within communities.

### Box 5.9 The role of communities in monitoring and evaluation

Community-based organizations (CBOs) have proved to be an effective means of monitoring and evaluation. In the Pakistan Earthquake Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (ERRP), CBO members were trained in seismically resistant construction. These community organizations took responsibility for monitoring reconstruction being carried out by villagers and guiding them in case of deviation from accepted guidelines. CBOs in some cases undertook responsibility for collective procurement, transportation of material and collective excavation of foundations for reconstruction of houses. This resulted in savings of up to 21 percent in construction costs.

*Source: Pakistan ERRP (2007).*

International experience has demonstrated that communities have a key role to play in monitoring the appropriateness and quality of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. CBOs can check on progress and provide feedback to contractors, government, and donors. Agreements with governments and contractors (where used) should incorporate a role for CBOs in quality assurance systems, and the CBOs should be given guidance on carrying out the role. The Ecuador El Niño Emergency Recovery Project engaged an NGO to facilitate interactions between stakeholders and to conduct training programs (Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network, 2001). Government agencies also can be trained to carry out technical and social audits.

### Integrating risk reduction into rebuilding programs

The construction of housing and human settlements also offers opportunities to provide information and support to affected people who need to understand their current and future vulnerability. This will allow them to better determine in what ways their building patterns are vulnerable to risks, what efforts can be made to strengthen housing and community facilities with minimum adverse impact on the local economy and environment, and how this protection can be maintained over the longer term

#### Box 5.10 Rebuilding more flood-resistant human settlements

House construction:

- Raising plinths and foundations.
- Combining a strong frame with lighter wall material that can be replaced after floods
- Raising shelves to protect valuables.
- Using more-durable building materials that resist water damage.
- Planting water-resistant plants and trees to protect shelters from erosion.
- Establishing community committees to monitor construction quality and settlement planning.
- Doing community outreach to promote hazard-resistant design approaches in future building.

Settlement Planning:

- Prohibiting resettlement in the most hazardous areas, if possible.
- Improving access to safe land. (Many people must choose to live in floodprone areas to ensure access to shelter or livelihoods.)
- Limiting obstruction of natural channels, using absorbent paving materials and roof catchments to reduce runoff; designing drainage to minimize intensity of water flows.
- Raising and reinforcing access roads.
- Establishing community emergency shelters and evacuation routes.
- Setting up early warning systems, including rain or river gauges and community monitoring to alert communities to flood threats.

Source: Adapted from Alam et al, 2008, p. 11.

**Table 5.2 Common Natural Disasters and Some Environment-Related Consequences**

Type of Disaster	Associated Environmental Impact
Hurricane/ Cyclone/ Typhoon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of vegetation cover and wildlife habitat</li> <li>• Short-term heavy rains and flooding inland</li> <li>• Mud slides and soil erosion</li> <li>• Saltwater intrusion to underground fresh water reservoirs</li> <li>• Soil contamination from saline water</li> <li>• Damage to offshore coral reefs and natural coastal defense mechanisms</li> <li>• Waste (some of which may be hazardous) and debris accumulation</li> <li>• Secondary impacts by temporarily displaced people</li> <li>• Impacts associated with reconstruction and repair to damaged infrastructure (e.g., deforestation, quarrying, waste pollution)</li> </ul>
Tsunami	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Groundwater pollution through sewage overflow</li> <li>• Saline incursion and sewage contamination of groundwater reservoirs</li> <li>• Loss of productive fisheries and coastal forest/plantations</li> <li>• Destruction of coral reefs</li> <li>• Coastal erosion and/or beneficial deposition of sediment on beaches/small islands</li> <li>• Marine pollution from back flow of wave surge</li> <li>• Soil contamination</li> <li>• Loss of crops and seed banks</li> <li>• Waste accumulation; additional waste disposal sites required</li> <li>• Secondary impacts by temporarily displaced people</li> <li>• Impacts associated with reconstruction and repair to damaged infrastructure (e.g., deforestation, quarrying, waste pollution)</li> </ul>
Earthquake	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of productive systems (e.g., agriculture)</li> <li>• Damage to natural landscapes and vegetation</li> <li>• Possible mass flooding if dam infrastructure weakened or destroyed</li> <li>• Waste accumulation; additional waste disposal sites required</li> <li>• Secondary impacts by temporarily displaced people</li> <li>• Impacts associated with reconstruction and repair to damaged infrastructure (e.g., deforestation, quarrying, waste pollution)</li> <li>• Damaged infrastructure as a possible secondary environmental threat (e.g., leakage from fuel storage facilities)</li> </ul>
Flood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Groundwater pollution through sewage overflow</li> <li>• Loss of crops, livestock, and livelihood security</li> <li>• Excessive siltation may affect certain fish stocks</li> <li>• River bank damage from erosion</li> <li>• Water and soil contamination fertilizers used</li> <li>• Secondary impacts by temporarily displaced people</li> <li>• Beneficial sedimentation in floodplains or close to river banks</li> </ul>

(continues to next page)

**Table 5.2 Common Natural Disasters and Some Environment-Related Consequences**  
(continued)

Type of Disaster	Associated Environmental Impact
Volcanic Eruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of productive landscape and crops being buried by ash and pumice</li> <li>• Forest fires as a result of molten lava</li> <li>• Secondary impacts by temporarily displaced people</li> <li>• Loss of wildlife following gas release</li> <li>• Secondary flooding should rivers or valleys be blocked by lava flow</li> <li>• Damaged infrastructure as a possible secondary environmental threat (e.g., leakage from fuel storage facilities)</li> <li>• Impacts associated with reconstruction and repair to damaged infrastructure (e.g., deforestation, quarrying, waste pollution)</li> </ul>
Landslide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Damaged infrastructure as a possible secondary environmental threat (e.g., leakage from fuel storage facilities)</li> <li>• Secondary impacts by temporarily displaced people</li> <li>• Impacts associated with reconstruction and repair to damaged infrastructure (e.g., deforestation, quarrying, waste pollution)</li> </ul>
Drought	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of surface vegetation</li> <li>• Loss of biodiversity</li> <li>• Forced human displacement</li> <li>• Loss of livestock and other productive systems</li> </ul>
Epidemic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of biodiversity</li> <li>• Forced human displacement</li> <li>• Loss of productive economic systems</li> <li>• Introduction of new species</li> </ul>
Forest Fires	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of forest and wildlife habitat</li> <li>• Loss of biodiversity</li> <li>• Loss of ecosystem services</li> <li>• Loss of productive crops</li> <li>• Soil erosion</li> <li>• Secondary encroachment for settlement or agriculture</li> </ul>
Sand Storms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loss of productive agricultural land</li> <li>• Loss of productive crops</li> <li>• Soil erosion</li> </ul>

(ALNAP, 2003). For example, if a community has been experiencing or is expected to experience increased drought, then water harvesting technology can be introduced into housing design. If flooding events are regular or are expected to increase, homes and community facilities can be designed to better withstand this hazard.

### **Rehabilitating the Environment and Improving Natural Resources**

Natural disasters have many impacts on the environment. These can include soil erosion, water contamination, and losses of biodiversity and vegetation cover.

An environmental impact assessment (EIA) needs to be carried out in order to determine how the disaster has affected the environment and the safety of communities and those who depend on natural resources for their livelihoods. This can be done using a combination of technical and participatory methods, some of which can be incorporated into community-level vulnerability and capacity assessments (VCAs). The Benfield Hazard Research Institute and CARE have a well-developed and field-tested rapid post-disaster EIA methodology.<sup>4</sup> The U.N. Environment Programme also has recently developed and begun field-testing a post-disaster EIA tool.<sup>5</sup> Both include pro formas and checklists for gathering information.

In addition, humanitarian and relief-related activities may themselves have an impact on the environment. Specific attention needs to be given to these when planning rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The problematic activities include:

- overextraction of groundwater aquifers;
- water contamination from improper sewage disposal;
- selection of inappropriate or energy-intensive systems such as desalination plants;
- unsustainable supply of shelter materials;
- unsustainable use of timber for construction and fuelwood;
- deforestation;

### Box 5.11 Applying environmental safeguards in Madagascar

As part of the preparation for a supplemental credit after the 2004 cyclones, a preparation mission was undertaken to identify possible environmental and social safeguard risks associated with subprojects being funded under the FID (Fond d'Intervention pour le Développement) project. The main issues identified were inadequate waste management procedures for health centers and schools; lack of erosion control measures for feeder roads, particularly in areas prone to erosion; and potential cumulative impacts associated with improved access to natural habitats and forests via rural roads resulting in habitat degradation.

To address these issues, training has been provided to FID staff and their implementing partners on the application of good-practice measures for environmental protection during the construction and operation of sub-projects and on monitoring sub-projects for safeguard compliance.

Source: Madagascar Case Study, in this Toolkit.

<sup>4</sup> C Kelly (2005), *Quick Guide: Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters*. London: Benfield Hazard Research Centre, University College/CARE International. ea\_guidelines

<sup>5</sup> UNEP (2008), *Environmental Needs Assessment in Post-Disaster Situations: A Practical Guide for Implementation*. Geneva: UNEP . UNEP EIA

### Box 5.12 Protecting lives and livelihoods in Vietnam

The Vietnam Red Cross mangrove planting program was implemented in eight provinces in Vietnam to protect coastal inhabitants from typhoons and storms. The project created 2,000 hectares of mangrove plantations. This cost an average \$0.13 million a year over the period 1994 to 2001 but reduced the annual cost of dyke maintenance by \$7.1 million.

The program helped save lives, protect livelihoods, and generate livelihood opportunities, such as the production of marine fish. In 2001, the project area was struck by the worst typhoon in a decade. The lack of significant damage to the sea dyke and aquaculture pond systems demonstrated the effectiveness of the mangroves.

*Source:* Adapted from IUCN, 2006 and Benson and Twigg, 2007

- land degradation and soil erosion;
- waste disposal; and
- selection of inappropriate sites for temporary shelter and site planning (UNEP, 2008).

These considerations should be incorporated into the environmental safeguards analysis carried out as a part of recovery project and sub-project design and appropriate impact mitigation activities should be identified.

## Programming and Operational Issues

### *Identifying the Poor and Vulnerable*

Recovery is not a neutral process. There are always different interest groups and agendas that must be balanced when deciding where and how to allocate resources, and elite capture is a real risk (Cosgrave, 2008). Without careful planning, the recovery process can exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities. Social fund/CDD operations should be able to apply VCAs, participatory rapid appraisals (PRAs), or other forms of social analysis currently in use to determine who are the poorest and most vulnerable of the disaster-affected communities they are currently working or plan to work with. “Addressing Vulnerability” in Module 1 and “Targeting Vulnerable Groups” in Module 4 provide guidance on needs assessment and targeting approaches in a post-disaster context.

### *Communications*

People need access to information about reconstruction plans in order to make informed decisions about their own future plans. The TEC Indian Ocean tsunami and



### Box 5.13 Vulnerability targeting in a resettlement project

Through the Ecuador El Niño Emergency Recovery Project, 1001 of the poorest families in Ecuador were resettled into new homes. These people could not return to their original homes because their houses had been destroyed, and the local government had declared their areas as too dangerous to live in. A full social and economic support package was designed to accompany relocation.

Using information collected during the evacuation and rescue stage from several government agencies and NGOs, the Coordinating Unit for the *Programa de Emergencia para el Fenómeno del Niño* (COPEFEN) first selected the hardest hit cities and municipalities for the project. Based on an initial stakeholder analysis, COPEFEN identified characteristics of the poor affected by the floods. COPEFEN then established criteria for selection of the families that would be eligible to participate. These criteria were designed to target the poorest. In each of the 10 selected cities or communities, a committee was created with members from Civil Defense, the municipal government, the community, and, in some cases, volunteers.

These committees selected participating families based on the following criteria:

- House destroyed beyond repair by El Niño;
- Residence in the destroyed house at the time of El Niño;
- House located in one of the selected municipalities;
- Residence in temporary housing (rescue centers, tents, in the streets, or with other family or friends);
- Family consists of at least three members, or two members if one or both are elderly or if one of them is handicapped;
- Family does not own other property in Ecuador;
- Willingness to participate in the capacity building classes and in community works; and
- Agreement not to transfer the benefits of participating in the project, nor to rent or sell the property for 20 years.

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Source: World Bank, Social Development Note No 64, July 2001, p. 2.

earthquakes evaluation found that most organizations failed to inform affected people in a timely, accurate, and comprehensive manner, which greatly affected their ability to proceed with their own recovery activities (Telford, Cosgrave and Houghton, 2006). Social fund/CDD operations can support local government and partner organizations to ensure affected communities have access to accurate and up-to-date information on project progress and broader recovery. “Raising Risk Awareness and Changing Risk Behavior” in Module 3 and “Ensuring Good Beneficiary Communications” in Module 4 provide details of some methods that can be used.

### **Financing Recovery in Ongoing Social Fund/CDD Operations**

The main funding expense for emergency operations occurs during rehabilitation and reconstruction. Existing project portfolios may be adjusted or additional funding provided for projects following negotiations between the Bank and the borrowing

country. For major disasters, a donor conference may be convened to elicit pledges of grant aid or soft loan support from donors for identified recovery needs. Sometimes the aid substantially covers key recovery costs; at other times there is a shortfall that governments must meet themselves or choose priority projects from their recovery plans. In the latter case, the World Bank's lending portfolio may be adjusted, with some funds moved from development projects into rehabilitation and reconstruction. Social fund/CDD operations will need to make judicious choices from within their projects if faced with this need.

OP/BP 8.00 and the Standby Recovery Financing Facility may offer opportunities to make progressive linkages between post-disaster recovery programming and the integration of disaster risk reduction initiatives into Country Assistance Strategies, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and social fund/CDD operations. Such links are already being made in some countries, as funding for disaster recovery that incorporates risk reduction elements can be considered—in some instances—as a key element of poverty alleviation and integrated into normal programming channels. The Community Recovery Project through the Urban Poverty Program in Earthquakes-Tsunami Affected Areas of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and North Sumatra is an example.

Having the flexibility to program in this way should help deal with the issue of short timeframes (maximum of 3 years) in Bank emergency projects, when recovery often can take 5–10 years (World Bank/IEG, 2006a). This may entail diversifying the social fund/CDD eligibility criteria and sub-project menus to reflect any new forms of vulner-

#### Box 5.14 Earthquake recovery financing in Pakistan

The PPAF initially reallocated \$5 million from existing project sources to fund the relief effort. The World Bank later made \$100 million of additional funding available for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, including the restoration of infrastructure. However, because the number of destroyed and damaged houses greatly exceeded initial estimates, a further \$138 million was provided. The Earthquake Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (E3RP) component of this financing was considered an integral part of PPAF's ongoing poverty alleviation program and consistent with its development objective of "improving access of poor communities to infrastructure" through participatory development and social mobilization. Of the total of \$238 million, \$198 million was allocated to low-cost seismically appropriate housing, \$16 million to the rehabilitation or reconstruction of village-level infrastructure, and \$15 million to the restoration and rehabilitation of communities, with the remainder spent on monitoring, supervision, operating costs, and technical support.

The International Fund for Agriculture Development and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Financial Cooperation) also contributed funds: \$26.37 million and \$16.8 million respectively.

Source: Pakistan Case Study, in this Toolkit.

ability or disaster mitigation/climate change adaptation activities identified during post-disaster needs assessments, as MASAF did during the 2005 drought response.

The new Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction launched the Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF) in 2007. The SRFF supports accelerated disaster recovery in low-income countries. It links recovery financing with *ex ante* disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. The SRFF is structured to fast-track the distribution of predictable and effective disaster recovery resources that enable risk reduction to be introduced into the disaster recovery phase, when there is the greatest opportunity to “build back better.” It is administered by the World Bank and managed by a partnership between the Bank, the UN/ISDR, major donors, and recipient countries. It has two funding mechanisms:

- The Technical Assistance Fund, which supports technical assistance for disaster recovery planning to strengthen preparedness and response, including the deployment of Standby Recovery Teams to help with needs assessments and post-disaster planning, and
- The Callable Fund, which is activated when a disaster strikes—its resources are targeted to support Disaster Recovery and Financing Plans—or similar recovery plans—developed by the affected country (World Bank GFDDR website, 2008).

While this support may not be channeled through social fund/CDD operations, it could still potentially bring some benefits—for example, through the provision of expertise to partner governments on community-based needs assessments and planning.

### Further Resources

Below are some of the major resources available on this topic. For bibliographical information on the documents and other resources cited in this Module, please see the References section at the end of the Toolkit.

#### **Documents**

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### Web Sites

International Recovery Platform: <http://www.recoveryplatform.org>

The International Recovery Platform is a multi-agency initiative launched in May 2005 to support the Hyogo Framework for Action. It seeks to fulfill strategic goal (c) of the framework by

functioning as an international repository of knowledge and as a networking mechanism for recovery, aiming to address the gaps and constraints inherent in the current contexts of recovery.

ProVention Consortium: <http://www.proventionconsortium.org>

The ProVention Consortium is a global coalition of international organizations, governments, the private sector, civil society organizations, and academic institutions dedicated to increasing the safety of vulnerable communities and reducing the impacts of disasters in developing countries. Among other things, ProVention develops innovative approaches to the practical applications of disaster risk management and shares knowledge and resources for organizations, practitioners, and communities.

Shelter Centre: <http://www.sheltercentre.org>

The Shelter Centre is an NGO supporting communities affected by conflicts and natural disasters through collaboration and consensus in humanitarian transitional settlement and reconstruction response. It is involved in research, development, dissemination, and operational implementation of humanitarian settlements and shelter policy, best practices, equipment, and field programs. The Shelter Centre also coordinates a shelter practitioners' network that meets biannually.

