Report Number: ICRR0022465

1. Project Data

Project ID P130835	**Project Name** KP Southern Area Development Project	
Country Pakistan	**Practice Area(Lead)** Agriculture and Food	
L/C/TF Number(s) TF-13560	**Closing Date (Original)** 30-Jun-2015	**Total Project Cost (USD)** 16,133,374.00
Bank Approval Date 11-Jan-2013	**Closing Date (Actual)** 31-Dec-2019	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	22,000,000.00	22,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	16,133,374.00	16,133,374.00
Actual	16,133,374.00	16,133,374.00

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Multi-Donor Trust Fund Grant Agreement and in the Emergency Project Paper (EPP, page 15) was:

" To strengthen the capacity of the poor to improve their livelihood options through access to social and productive infrastructure using participatory approaches in selected districts of southern Khyber

Pakhtunkwa Province". That is, Dera Ismail Khan (DIK), Tank and Lakki Marwat that are adversely affected by the crisis.

This assessment is based on the singular objective stated above.

The PDO did not change with the Additional Financing (AF) for the project on March 17, 2017.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

There were three components (EPP, pages 15 - 17).

1. Community Development Support. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$1.4 million. With AF, the revised estimate was US$1.6 million. The actual cost was US$1.6 million. This component planned to finance Technical Assistance (TA) activities aimed at mobilizing Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) at the selected districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and federating them at the Tehsil level (an administrative sub-division of a district) into Clustered Economic Interest Groups (CEIGs). Activities in this component: (i) capacity building of the EIGs and CEIGs and training project facilitators: (ii) empowering the EIGs and CEIGs to access advisory services from public and private sources: and (iii) financing a communications and outreach strategy.

2. Community Driven Investment Program. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$13.9 million. With AF, the revised estimate was US$16.0 million. The actual cost was US$8.0 million. This component planned to finance community investments through grants for rehabilitating: (i) social infrastructure (minor repair of schools, feeder roads, community health and water supply facilities): (ii) productive infrastructure (small scale on and off farm infrastructure, vocational training and skills development centers): and (iii) asset-building of the ultra poor (rebuilding home/shelters), or their income livelihood sources (livestock or poultry), that were either lost/damaged during the military operations.

3. Project Implementation Support. The estimated cost at appraisal was US2.5 million. With AF, the revised estimate of this component was US$4.4 million. The actual cost was US$4.0 million. This component planned to provide project management support in areas such as, developing a communication strategy and monitoring and evaluation.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$18.0 million. With AF of US$4.0, the revised estimate was US$22.0 million. The actual cost was US$13.7 million (ICR, page 44).

Project financing. The project was financed by a Multi-Donor Trust Fund of US$18.0 million for supporting a program of reconstruction and development of the affected regions in KP Province. AF of

US$4.0 million was approved on March 17, 2017. With this, the total funding was US$22.0 million. The AF loan was not utilized and cancelled in June 2020. The amount disbursed from the original grant was US$13.7 million. An undisbursed balance of the original grant of US$2.4 million was cancelled.

Borrower contribution. Borrower contribution was not planned at appraisal. There was no borrower contribution during implementation.

Dates. The original project, designed as an emergency operation became effective on February 6, 2013, and was scheduled to close two and half years later on June 30, 2015. The original project closed ton March 31, 2017. AF was approved on March 17, 2017. The AF project closed on December 31, 2019.

There were seven level 2 project restructurings during implementation. The first five restructurings were all tied to the extension of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and entailed extension of the original project closing date, that were delayed during implementation.

- The first restructuring on June 2015, extended the closing date by four months from June 30, 2015, to October 31, 2015.
- The second restructuring on October 2015, extended the closing date by two months from October 31, 2015, to December 31, 2015.
- The third restructuring on December 2015, extended the closing date by six months from December 31, 2015, to June 30, 2016.
- The fourth restructuring on June 2016, extended the closing date by six months from June 30, 2016, to December 31, 2016.
- The fifth restructuring on December 31, 2016, extended the closing date by three months from December 31, 2016, to March 31, 2016.

The following changes were made through the sixth project restructuring on March 2016, following the AF for the project.

- The geographical coverage of activities was expanded to support temporarily displaced persons from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to KP, following the Zarb-e-Arab military operation. The ICR (page 10) notes that the military operation, along with a history of conflict and crises in the area (including earthquakes and floods), temporarily displaced about three million people. With relative improvement in the security situation, many displaced people started returning home in the second half of 2018 and 2019.
- The results framework was modified and some targets for key outcome indicators were scaled upwards (discussed in section 9).
- The AF project was scheduled to close on December 31, 2018.

The closing date for the AF grant was extended by one year from December 31, 2018, to December 31, 2019.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country context. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region, in the northwestern part of Pakistan, is one of the poorest regions in the country. Access to basic services and facilities in the region are limited, and lagged far behind than in the rest of Pakistan. The situation was further exacerbated at appraisal by the ongoing militant crisis (In 2009, the Government launched major operations in the region to eliminate local pockets of militants, which in addition to the human tragedy, imposed significant economic costs).

Alignment with the Government strategy. The PDOs were consistent with the Government's objectives. In 2009, after the military operation, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, conducted a Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA), followed by a Post-Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA), at the Government's request. The PCNA identified four priority areas: (i) political and governance reform: (ii) stimulating employment opportunities: (iii) improving service delivery: and (iv) supporting reconciliation efforts. Recognizing the need for a harmonized approach, the Government requested the Bank to administer a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for supporting recovery of the affected areas. This project aimed at supporting the Government's strategic objectives of enhancing growth in the most seriously affected districts of KP. The PDOs were also well-aligned with the most recent Integrated Development Strategy (ITS) of the Government of KP for 2014 - 2018. The strategy put community involvement at the center for effective delivery of social services (such as, health, water supply and sanitation services).

Alignment with the Bank strategy. The PDO was well-aligned with the Bank Strategy. The Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2010 - 2013, recognized that conflict and insecurity represented major obstacles to economic development and poverty reduction. The PDOs were consistent with two CPS pillars: (i) Improving infrastructure to support growth: and (ii) Improving security and reducing the risk of conflict. The PDOs continues to be relevant to the Bank's most recent Country Partnership Strategy for 2015 - 2019. The third pillar of the strategy explicitly articulated the need for inclusive growth of vulnerable groups, including women and youth.

Prior Bank experience. This project was designed as an emergency operation, aimed at addressing the key challenges of restoring service delivery in the selected KP districts. The Community Driven Development (CDD) approach (through empowering communities and holding local government accountable for implementing the priorities identified by the communities) was used, as this participatory approach had proven successful elsewhere in Pakistan (Community Infrastructure Projects - Phase 1 and 2). Alongside this project, the Bank was also implementing projects in KP such as, the Economic Revitalization Project aimed at creating sustainable job opportunities, and FATA Governance Support Project aimed at improving service delivery, and was in the process of preparing the Revitalizing Health Service in KP aimed at improving the availability, accessibility of primary and secondary services at the district level in six military and flood affected districts of KP.

While the PDOs were relevant to the Government and Bank strategies, the original project time-frame of two and half years was overly ambitious, given the local conditions in which the activities were to be implemented. Unlike the prior experience of participatory and community-driven approach (CDD) elsewhere in Pakistan, the activities in this project were to be implemented in a fragile area with remnants of conflict and complex security conditions. The original project time frame was extended to four and half years, and even with this extension several activities such as clustering Economic Interest Groups proved to be unimplementable, and were dropped with the AF financing for the project. The relevance of the PDO is rated as substantial.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

To strengthen the capacity of the poor to improve their livelihood options through access to social and productive infrastructure using participatory approaches in selected districts of southern Khyber Pakhtunkwa Province.

Rationale

Theory of Change. The project used a participatory approach and Community-based Organizations (CBOs) for identifying infrastructure investments in selected affected KP districts. Establishing Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) and Clustering Economic Interest Groups (CEIGs), training project facilitators, empowering CBOs and outreach to stakeholders, were aimed at developing Community Action Plans (CAPs) for improving service delivery in the selected communities. Providing grants to communities for investments in productive infrastructure and asset-building of the ultra-poor, were aimed at strengthening the capacity of the poor to improve their livelihood options in the selected areas. The original project design erroneously assumed that the time frame of two and half years was adequate and that the communities had the required capacity for implementing the CDD approach in areas that still had security concerns. This contributed to the non-implementation of several of the activities envisioned in the project. The causal links between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were clear, and the intended outcomes were monitorable.

Outputs (ICR, pages 12 - 17 and pages 30 - 41).

- 1,390 Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), of which 41% were female-led, were formed with 34,331 households or 274,648 persons, to assist communities identify their livelihood options, as per the revised target and exceeding the original target of 1,000 CBOs.
- 550 Community Action Plans (CAPs) for subprojects were prepared in a participatory manner (with community engagement in post-project sustainability of Operations and Maintenance (O&M)) at project closure. This exceeded the target of 500 CAPs. The CAPs were approved by the Subproject/Activity Review and Approval Committee.
- 366 social infrastructure subprojects (including street pavement and drainage schemes, roads, bridges and culverts, drinking water and sanitation facilities, school buildings, flood protection walls and health unit buildings), were financed by the project (No targets were set for this indicator). Of these, 346 were complete when the project closed. The remaining subprojects were incomplete due to

factors such as inadequate time, security concerns and community disputes. The ICR notes that the communities shared the cost with a 15% contribution, and the subprojects were executed by the communities. Of the 75 social infrastructure subprojects evaluated by a Third-Party Monitoring Agency (TPMA), the majority were rated satisfactory on key evaluation parameters (such as, design, workmanship, materials quality and necessary ancillary works). The TPMA however noted that detailed design drawings were not prepared for some subprojects and some subprojects lacked parts such as drains, culverts and retaining walls).

- 54 productive infrastructure investments (irrigation channels, livestock water ponds and veterinary centers) were completed in the three KP affected areas, when the project closed. Fifty of these were new productive infrastructure investments and four were the rehabilitation of existing infrastructure investments. There were no targets for this indictor. These investments were rated as overall satisfactory by the TPMA on key evaluation parameters discussed above (although the TPMA did observe some issues such as, damage from ineffective water distribution plans and misuse of the channel at the sewerage system in some channels).
- 2,567 community members were trained when the project closed, exceeding the target of 1,245. Of these, 1,786 community members were males (exceeding the target of 2720, and 781 were females (short of the target of 973). 24 vocational training programs were conducted at project closure (There were no targets for this indictor).
- 179 grain storage containers and inputs and fertilizers were provided to 370 households (There were no targets for this indictor).

Outcomes.

The project activities were expected to increase the number of beneficiaries from the project activities and increase the percentage of the population accessing social and productive infrastructure relative to the baseline.

- 96,832 people benefitted from the original project activities, short of the target of 100,000. 52% of the beneficiaries were females, exceeding the target of 30.
- 40% of the population were expected to have access to social and productive infrastructure created under the aegis of this project, when the project closed, relative to the baseline (50% males and 40% females). The ICR notes that this indicator was not measured throughout the project, and no survey was conducted when the project closed.
- There were no indicators for the activity associated with asset restoration and livelihood activities of the ultra poor.

In sum, although the activities associated with the participatory approach were completed for the most part, given that there is no direct evidence on actual access to social and productive infrastructure that could be attributed to this project, efficacy is rated as modest.

Rating
Modest

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

Efficacy is rated as modest, in view of the insufficient evidence on the extent to which outcomes could be attributed to project activities.

Overall Efficacy Rating	Primary Reason
Modest	Insufficient evidence

5. Efficiency

Economic analysis. An economic analysis was not conducted at appraisal, as the infrastructure investments were to be demand-driven and not known a priori. The PAD (paragraph 61) notes that as the infrastructure investments were to be identified by local communities, prior Bank- experience showed that the benefits were expected to come from the institutional strengthening of communities. The expected benefits to the agricultural sector were from: (i) farm-level efficiency due to improvements to production, marketing, and logistics: (ii) value addition at farm and/or off-farm level due to greater integration between producers, traders and processors: and (iii) increased market access and reduction in economic losses due to improvements in management. An ex post economic analysis was not conducted due to a lack of of data and the absence of a survey to assess project attributable changes to agriculture and livestock productivity, and on and off-farm improvements in livelihoods due to the social infrastructure.

An ex post efficiency analysis was conducted to assess the project's performance and cost, with a comparable emergency response project with identical features such as design, implementation schedule, and terrain (the Multi-Donor Trust Fund financed FATA Rural Livelihoods and Community Infrastructure Project (RLCIP) (ICR, page 47). This analysis focused on the achievements of the original project as there had been no disbursements of AF. The appraisal estimate of this project was US$18.0 million. The project closed with 76% of the original grant (US$13.7 million) utilized. In effect, in current cost terms, the project underspent by 24% of the appraisal estimate, while achieving the original targets of social infrastructure. After adjusting for inflation effects, the actual expenditure was even lower at 39% of the appraisal estimate. According to the ICR (paragraph 44), this was due to the shift in focus of activities towards social infrastructure (56% more than expected at appraisal) from productive infrastructure demand which was low under fragile conditions, following the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review (discussed below).

Administrative and operational issues during implementation. There were administrative and operational shortcomings during implementation. Forming CBOs (CBOs) under unpredictable security conditions, required a significantly longer time than the original time frame of two and half years. Hence the focus of the project activities shifted from productive infrastructure to social infrastructure, which was expected to benefit larger groups of numbers. Nevertheless, even with this shift in focus, when the AF of US$4.0 million was approved, more than US$8.0 million (out of US$18.0 million) of the original loan was undisbursed. The AF eventually was not disbursed at all and was cancelled on June 2020. The significant time overrun of the original project resulted in additional management costs of US1.4 million. There were other administrative issues during implementation. The position of the permanent Project Director remained vacant for most of the project duration and this led to delays in initiation, approval of infrastructure grants and timely payment to the executing community institutions. Project staff training on livelihoods did not occur until 2018, and this affected implementation of these activities. According to the ICR (paragraph 65), the project was also subject of an investigation by the National Accountability Bureau in 2019, due to allegations of corruption by project staff. Overall project management remained throughout implementation, and this undermined efficiency in terms of value for money.

In sum, overall efficiency is rated as modest, in view of the administrative and operational issues during implementation.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 ☐ Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 ☐ Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO is substantial. Efficacy of the single objective is modest, in view of insufficient evidence of the outcomes that could be attributed to the project. Efficiency is modest, given the administrative and operational shortcomings during implementation. Taking these ratings into account, outcome is rated as moderately unsatisfactory, reflecting significant shortcomings in the project's achievement of its objective and in its efficiency.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Institutional risk. The ICR (paragraph 87) notes that none of the 1,390 Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) created under this project were legally registered. The project activities provided limited capacity building to only a few groups for fiduciary management. There were neither arrangements for post-project follow up, nor arrangements for linkages with other development projects or government programs. Given this, there is high risk to outcomes associated with institutional sustainability of the CBOs.

Technical risk. The ICR (paragraph 88) acknowledges that the grant ceiling for the infrastructure schemes created under this project, were insufficient to construct or rehabilitate infrastructure in a technically sound manner. Also, given that the CBOs were not trained on Operation and Maintenance (O&M) arrangements, there is considerable risk to sustainability of the project infrastructure created under this project.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

This project was designed as an emergency operation, and the infrastructure interventions were to follow a CDD approach that had delivered positive results in Pakistan (Pakistan - Community Infrastructure Projects - Phase 1 and 2). The implementation arrangements were appropriate, with the Project Management Unit (PIU), located in the premises of the the Local Government, Election and Rural Development Department (LGERDD) of the Government of KP, the main implementing agency. Several risks were identified at appraisal, including risks associated with inaccessibility to some parts of the selected districts due to security issues. The mitigation measures incorporated at design included, remote supervision, designing feedback and communication systems, and setting a grievance handling system. Even with mitigation measures, project risk was rated as high at appraisal (EPP, paragraph 80). Given the prevailing security conditions, alternative arrangements were made to ensure timely supervision (such as, Third Party Monitoring Agency (TPMA) for asset verification and monitoring and evaluation, and technologies such as Pointers and the Integrated Voice Recording System (IVR) to register grievances). The arrangements made at appraisal for environmental and fiduciary compliance were appropriate (discussed in section 10).

There were major shortcomings at Quality-at-Entry. First, as discussed in section 3, the original time frame of two and half years was overly ambitious, given the unpredictable security situation and intra and inter-community conflicts. Even with the project closing date extended by two years, many activities (such as, productive infrastructure investments and investments in asset-building for the ultra-poor), could not be implemented as envisioned. It is not clear if complexities associated with CDD modalities under fragile, Violence and Conflict (FCV) situations were sufficiently considered at appraisal. Second, the mitigation measures incorporated at design for the weak implementation capacity and security considerations were inadequate. The deteriorating security situation contributed to high staff turnover and demotivation of field staff. Three, the analytical underpinnings of the project, in terms of the drivers of growth were unsound. The ICR (paragraph 81) notes that the livelihood interventions were primarily designed around agriculture and livestock activities, although only eight percent of the land was arable in one out of the three selected districts, and four, there were M&E design shortcomings (discussed in section 9).

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Supervision missions were held twice a year on average and thirteen Implementation Status Results Reports filed over a project lifetime of seven years (ICR, page 3). Given security considerations, supervision arrangements, included remote supervision and through a grievance handling system. The supervision team provided support for addressing issues with safeguards and fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 10b).

There were significant supervision shortcomings. First, although the Mid-Term Review (MTR) recognized that the project would not be able to achieve the targets within the remaining part of the implementation period and proposed remedial measures for overcoming design shortcomings, an AF for the project was prepared despite the weak implementation capacity and security conditions. While the AF for the project, presented an opportunity to address the project's design shortcomings, analyze the impact of pilot interventions, set more realistic targets and prepare an exit strategy, AF was prepared with limited understanding of realities on the ground. As such, there was limited justification for scale up with AF. When the project closed in 2019, the AF funds were unutilized and cancelled. Second, the ICR (paragraph 84) notes that supervision could have been proactive and candid in addressing the implementation challenges in a timely manner. There were inconsistencies in reporting, and indicators were either revised or dropped without formal restructuring. Three, the supervision was hampered by lack of continuity of leadership, with four Task Team Leaders (TTLs) during the project lifetime (ICR, paragraph 84).

In sum, the overall rating for Bank performance is unsatisfactory, based on the ratings for quality-at-Entry and supervision quality.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Unsatisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The output and outcome indicators of this project, designed as an emergency project, had over-ambitious targets based on unrealistic assumptions, given the original project time frame of two and half years. There were no key outcome indicators to measure livelihood options for the ultra poor. The results framework to reduce project targets initiated in 2015 was never finalized. Although the results framework was modified with AF for the project, this did not address the shift in relevance of design from an emergency operation to a regular investment operation.

The M&E design envisioned a baseline survey to identify actual interventions and targets, and midline and end-time surveys to determine the project impact at closure. The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was responsible for M&E, and was to be supported by a Third Party Monitoring Agency (TPMA) for monitoring progress.

b. M&E Implementation

Although the baseline survey was conducted, the M&E design did not incorporate survey design and tools, timeline, implementation arrangements, and no resources were allocated for monitoring project activities. The design of the survey was inadequate to capture attribution. The lack of a survey at mid term and at the end of the project, precluded effective monitoring of project performance. The ICR (paragraph 71) notes that monitoring of results was intermittent and had considerable quality issues (with inconsistencies in indicator titles and units of measure), and indicators were omitted or added without formal restructuring.

The ICR (paragraph 72) notes that while reporting by the TPMA was notable for its candor, its contract was not renewed in 2017. Post 2017, progress reports were limited to basic physical and financial data, and these had quality issues as well.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR (paragraph 73) notes that the information provided by the TPMA were not addressed. Similarly while the project Monitoring Information System (MIS) on infrastructure was adequate to setting realistic targets for major results and outcome indicators at AF, it had not been used to that end.

In sum, M&E is rated as negligible due to the limitations in M&E design, which limited the availability of credible data to support an accurate assessment of the project's efficacy and efficiency.

M&E Quality Rating

Negligible

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B (Partial Assessment) project under the World Bank's Safeguard Policies. One safeguard policy was triggered at appraisal (Emergency Project Paper, page 4). There were no other safeguard policies during implementation.

The Emergency Project Paper (paragraph 71) notes that adverse environmental impacts (such as, soil erosion, water contamination, air quality deterioration, and safety and health hazards for workers) of project activities, were limited. An Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) and a project- specific Environment and Social Assessment Plans were prepared and publicly-disclosed at appraisal (Emergency Project Paper, paragraphs 72 and 73).

The ICR (paragraph 75) notes that the project's ability to submit quarterly progress reports of the ESMP were hampered during implementation, as the positions for environmental, social and gender specialists remained vacant for most of the project life. The ICR does not provide details on whether there were adverse environmental impacts, or whether there was compliance with environmental safeguards.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management. A financial management assessment conducted at appraisal, concluded that the financial management risks were High. The financial arrangements were to be reassessed once the implementation arrangements were in place (EPP, paragraph 62). The ICR (paragraph 78) notes that financial management was satisfactory. The financial reports and audited annual financial statements were submitted in a timely fashion. However, there were instances of ineligible expenditures and conflicts of interest at project and CBO level and advance payments to project staff. The ICR provides no information on the quality of audits.

Procurement. An assessment of the procurement management capacity of the Local Government, Election and Rural Development Department (LGERDD) was conducted at appraisal (EPP, paragraph 136). The assessment concluded that the procurement arrangements were satisfactory.The ICR (paragraph 79) notes that there was procurement compliance, although there were significant delays in initiation and completion of works. The ICR does not report of any case of mis procurement.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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d. Other

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11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Negligible	Negligible	
Quality of ICR	---	High	

12. Lessons

The ICR draws the following main lessons from the experience of implementing this project, with some adaptation of language.

1**. Project design needs to be tailored to suit the local context, with appropriately identified risk and mitigation measures.** With an implementation period of only two and half years and a limited implementing capacity operating in a fragile environment, the Community-Driven Development (CDD) was inappropriate given the realities on the ground. Further, the activities to increase access to productive infrastructure were ill-suited to improve livelihood options, because they revolved around agriculture and livestock raising, in an area where only eight percent of the land was arable

2. Capacity building strategy for CDD operations is required for sustainability of project outcomes. In this project, although efforts were made to link community based platforms with relevant governments at the district level, they were not followed through and none of the community groups were legally or formally registered.

3. M&E framework needs to be carefully designed, implemented and utilized to inform quality management and decision-making. This project was affected by the poor quality of data. The Bank did not have a clear grasp of implementation challenges and consequently did not address the key design constraints. Further, the lack of a survey at closure precluded monitoring performance of activities that were attributable to the project.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well-written and candidly discusses the issues associated with monitoring and evaluation. It also acknowledges the issues associated with applying a Community-based approach in a fragile context and explores the problems with the Additional Financing for the project (even when the original grant was not fully disbursed). The theory of change provided in the ICR clearly discusses the assumptions and the ratings provided in the ICR are consistent with the guidelines. Given the paucity of data and information on the project, the ICR team did a good job of capturing the challenges and issues preventing greater progress towards the PDO. This helps in formulating a more effective future pathway for similar projects.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
High